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4.1  Introduction 
There is now widespread acceptance of price stability as a macroeconomic 
objective among policymakers. This price stability consensus appears to ex- 
tend to the public at large and, to lesser extent, to professional economists too. 
That is the good news from Shiller’s (1997) survey of these two sets of agents. 
The bad news from the survey is the reason the public gave for disliking infla- 
tion: it was thought to have  eroded real wages over time, something that is 
patently at odds with the facts. There are two ways to interpret Shiller’s results. 
The pessimistic interpretation would be to take Shiller’s findings at face value 
and conclude that the costs of inflation are, literally, illusory-they  derive from 
money illusion. The optimistic interpretation would be that policymakers and 
academics have, to date, done a poor job of identifying, quantifying, and ulti- 
mately advertising the costs of inflation to the public. 
With the optimistic interpretation in mind, this paper aims to identify and 
quantify some such costs for the United Kingdom. Much has been written on 
the theoretical justification for stable prices (Fischer and Modigliani 1975 is a 
classic treatment; for surveys, see also Driffill, Mizon, and Ulph 1990; Fischer 
1981; Briault 1995). But there is less empirical work quantifying the costs and 
benefits of price stability and, particularly, placing them in a welfare context. 
One of the few previous attempts by the Bank of England to articulate con- 
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cretely some of the costs of inflation (Leigh-Pemberton 1992) listed the fol- 
lowing costs of afully anticipated inflation: 
Cost  of  economizing  on  real  money  balances-so-called  shoe-leather 
Costs of operating a less than perfectly indexed tax system; 
Costs of “front-end loading” of nominal debt contracts; 
Cost of constantly revising price lists-so-called  menu costs. 
Feldstein (1997b) seeks to quantify the first two of these costs when moving 
from 2 percent inflation to price stability in the United States. That is the pri- 
mary aim of this paper too. It focuses on distortions to saving, (housing and 
business) investment, and money demand decision making brought about by a 
fully anticipated 2 percent inflation tax, operating either unilaterally or, more 
often, in tandem with the tax system in the United Kingdom.’ The paper also 
explores the indirect effects on the government’s period-by-period budget con- 
straint of  a shift to price stability. We  end up with estimates of  the costs of 
inflation in the United Kingdom that work through the channels identified by 
Feldstein in the United States. Exercises such as this inevitably require simpli- 
fying assumptions. So we also conduct some sensitivity analysis on our results. 
The analysis is clearly restrictive, as it ignores many of the other welfare costs 
of inflation-for  example, those associated with unanticipated inflation. Be- 
cause of this, the paper is best seen as quantifying a subset of the feasible range 
of welfare benefits that lower inflation might engender; it is strictly a lower 
bound. In other words, we calculate sume of the benefits of lower inflation and 
then compare those with an estimate of the total cost of  disinflating. This is 
rather a tough test. 
Focusing on the effects of fully anticipated inflation means that the welfare 
costs we consider are the deadweight loss triangles familiar from public fi- 
nance economics.2  Until recently, many economists have believed that the costs 
of fully anticipated inflation are relatively unimportant, or at least that they are 
less important than the costs of unanticipated inflation. In a celebrated quote, 
Tobin summarized this view in “it takes a heap of Harberger triangles to fill an 
Okun gap.” And on the face of it, there is little in the aggregate time-series or 
cross-sectional data to question this view at the levels of  inflation currently 
prevailing within developed economies. 
For example, in a cross-sectional study of over 100 countries, Barro (1995) 
finds little relationship between inflation and growth at rates of inflation below 
effects; 
1. Physical menu costs and front-end loading have generally been found to have small effects: 
E.g., survey evidence in Blinder (1992) for the United States and Hall, Walsh, and Yates (1996) 
for the United Kingdom does not support menu costs as an important influence on firms’ price- 
setting behavior. Schwab (1982) finds that the welfare costs of front-end loading are not large for 
reasonably sized changes in inflation. 
2. Bailey (1956) was one of the first exponents of such micro-to-macro welfare analysis in the 
context of money demand distortions. 135  Some Costs and Benefits of Price Stability in the United Kingdom 
10 percent-though  at rates of inflation above this there is evidence that infla- 
tion is a significant drag on growth. Likewise, Sarel(l996) finds no evidence 
of inflation inhibiting growth at rates of inflation below 8 percent-but,  again, 
that there are significantly adverse effects on growth at rates of inflation above 
this3  Looking at one level of disaggregation, Rudebusch and Wilcox (1994) 
find a significant inverse relationship between productivity growth and infla- 
tion in the United States over the period  1955-93.  But even that relationship 
appears to disintegrate in the United Kingdom at levels of  inflation below 5 
percent (Bianchi and Smith 1995):  Taken  together, there is little from this 
aggregate evidence to strongly support a move from single-digit inflation fig- 
ures to price stability. 
There are at least three reasons why these empirical studies are, by  them- 
selves, insufficient to close the case for price stability. First, even if  lower in- 
flation has little or no effect on an economy’s growth rate, it can still generate 
a permanent boost to the level of GDP, with potentially infinitely lived effects 
on welfare (Feldstein 1979). The resulting welfare gain may well then have a 
large present value even if, at first blush, its first-round effect appears trivial. 
By contrast, in a world of policy neutrality, the welfare costs of disinflating are 
likely to be one-off and transient. So welfare analysis of the costs and benefits 
of inflation is inevitably a comparison between static costs and dynamic bene- 
fits-with  the odds correspondingly weighted in favor of the latter (see King 
1994). Importantly, such effects may well go undetected by empirical studies 
looking at secular growth rates over long runs of data. 
Second, aggregate time series may  simply be too crude a tool to pick up 
some of  the distorting effects of  inflation, especially as such distortions are 
likely to be smaller and more subtle at lower rates of inflation. One response 
to this mixed bag of macroempirical results would therefore be to look directly 
at the microlevel decisions that inflation is thought likely to be distorting. That 
has been the response most recently among general equilibrium real business 
cycle theorists (inter alia, Cooley and Hansen 1989; Dotsey and Ireland 1996). 
By viewing inflation as a tax on microlevel decisions, these authors have been 
able to identify explicitly, and quantify empirically, some sizable welfare costs 
of  inflation at the macroeconomic level. This is broadly  our approach too, 
though within a partial rather than general equilibrium setting. 
Third, in a world of existing distortionary taxes, the consumer surplus for- 
gone by the interaction of taxes and inflation is not just the conventional Har- 
berger deadweight loss triangle, but a trape~oid.~  Or, put differently, adding a 
distortion (inflation) to an existing distortion (taxes) is likely to lead to welfare 
3. See also Fischer (1993), Smyth (1994), and Fry, Goodhart, and Almeida (1996) for cross- 
4. On the relationship  between investment and growth in the cross section, see Barro (1995) and 
5. This is the adjustment suggested by  Tower (1971) to the original money demand welfare 
sectional evidence on inflation-growth correlations. 
Fischer (1993). 
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losses that are first rather than second order in a world of unindexed tax sys- 
tems. Because these first-order distortions derive inherently from the interac- 
tion between inflation and taxes, we cannot then uniquely ascribe these welfare 
costs to a failure of monetary policy. Fiscal policy could equally well step into 
the breach. But what we can identify is the welfare benefits monetary policy, 
acting via lower inflation, might bring. And in the absence of a response from 
fiscal policy, these effects will be first rather than second order, or trapezoids 
rather than triangles. 
So what is the precise experiment we simulate? Much of the existing litera- 
ture focuses on comparative static comparisons of  low and moderate infla- 
tion-for  example, the costs of moving from 10 percent to zero inflation. That 
type of  experiment seems less apposite in today’s low-inflation environment. 
For example, in the United Kingdom RPIX inflation-retail  prices excluding 
mortgage interest payments, the government’s targeted measure of consumer 
prices-averaged  12.7 percent in the 1970s, 7.0 percent in the 1980s, but has 
fallen to an average 4.4 percent in the 1990s so far. Feldstein’s (1997b) study 
draws data from the period 1960-94  in the United States, during which time 
inflation averaged 4 to 5 percent. Making an allowance for the measurement 
bias in the US.  CPI of 2 percent,6  a shift to price stability would then be equiv- 
alent to a 2 percentage point fall in inflation from its historical levels in the 
United States. That is the policy experiment Feldstein simulates. 
In the United Kingdom, RPIX inflation is currently around 3 percent. It is 
widely thought that available price indexes overstate inflation, but estimates 
of the extent of the overstatement are highly uncertain. Cunningham (1996) 
quotes a possible range of central estimates of 0.35 to 1.3 percent per year. It 
is possible that starting from its current position, a 2 percentage point reduction 
in inflation would deliver approximate price stability in the United Kingdom. 
So this is the experiment we consider for the United Kingdom: a 2 percentage 
point fall in inflation, as in Feldstein’s U.S. study. Historically, of course, U.K. 
inflation has been rather higher than 3 percent, averaging 6 to 7 percent be- 
tween 1970 and 1995.’ 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 quantifies the output costs of 
disinflationary transition, and it quantifies the discounted flow of future bene- 
fits needed to offset this cost. Section 4.3 calculates distortions to rates of re- 
turn-and  hence  to  the  price  of  retirement consumption-resulting  from 
6. Recent estimates by Shapiro and Wilcox (1996) suggest that this adjustment may be on the 
high side. They estimate that there is a one-in-ten chance that the bias in the U.S. CPI is greater 
than 1.5 percent. The Shapiro-Wilcox estimates accord closely with Canadian evidence (Crawford 
1994). But measurement biases remain an area of great uncertainty, in particular with regard to 
new goods and quality biases (see, e.g., Nordhaus 1997 and, indeed, Shapiro and Wilcox’s 1996 
Medicare example). See also Boskin (1996). 
7. We select 1995 as the base year for our calculations because it is the most recent year for 
which a (near) full set of data is available. Because we are simulating the effect of a change in 
inflation from current levels, we use the effective marginal tax rates in operation during  1995, 
rather than historical averages. 137  Some Costs and Benefits of Price Stability in the United Kingdom 
Table 4.1  U.K. Estimates: Welfare Effects of a 2 Percentage Point Reduction in 
Inflation (percent of GDP) 
Indirect 
Welfare Effect of 
Direct Effect  Revenue Change  Net Welfare Effect 
of  Reduced 
Source of Change  Distortion  A = 0.4  A = 1.5  A = 0.4  A = 1.5 
Consumption timing 
IISR = 0.2  0.40  -0.12  -0.43  0.29  -0.03 
-qSR = 0.0  0.35  -0.14  -0.51  0.21  -0.17 
qsR  = 0.4  0.46  -0.09  -0.35  0.37  0.11 
Housing demand  0.04  0.07  0.27  0.11  0.30 
Money demand  0.02  -0.05  -0.17  -0.02  -0.15 
Debt service  n.a.  -0.09  -0.33  -0.09  -0.33 
Total 
TSR  = 0.2  0.47  -0.18  -0.67  0.29  -0.20 
qsR  = 0.0  0.41  -0.20  -0.75  0.21  -0.34 
rlsR = 0.4  0.52  -0.16  -0.59  0.37  -0.06 
Note: A is the marginal deadweight loss of an across-the-board tax increase that raises one extra 
pound of revenue. qsR  is elasticity of private saving with respect to the posttax real rate of return. 
n.a. = not applicable. 
inflation. Sections 4.4 and  4.5 look at  similar distortions affecting owner- 
occupied housing and money demand; while section 4.6 considers the impact 
on government debt servicing. Finally, the concluding section draws these esti- 
mates together and suggests some policy conclusions and extensions.8  These 
estimates are summarized in table 4.1 for the United Kingdom; table 4.2 pro- 
vides the equivalent estimates for the United States as a counterpoint. 
4.2  Costs of Disinflation 
4.2.1  Ball’s Sacrifice Ratio for the United Kingdom 
We begin by calculating some estimates of the output cost of a 2 percentage 
point reduction in inflation in the United Kingdom. Feldstein uses Ball’s (1994) 
well-known work on the sacrifice ratio. Ball’s approach is to estimate the cu- 
mulated loss in output required for each percentage point reduction in inflation. 
The resulting event-study sacrifice ratio estimates for the United Kingdom, 
based on two events in the 1960s, one in the 1970s, and a further two in the 
1980s, are summarized in table 4.3. They suggest numbers that are typically 
smaller than those found by Ball for the United States, averaging less than 1 
percent compared with 2 to 3 percent in the United States. 
But just how robust are these estimates? One reason to be skeptical is that 
8. An appendix provides some analysis of inflation effects on business investment. 138  Hasan Bakhshi, Andrew G. Haldane, and Neal Hatch 
Table 4.2  U.S. Estimates: Welfare Effects of a 2 Percentage Point Reduction in 
Inflation (percent of GDP) 
Indirect 
Welfare Effect of 
Direct Effect  Revenue Change  Net Welfare Effect 
of Reduced 
Source of Change  Distortion  A = 0.4  A = 1.5  A = 0.4  A = 1.5 
Consumption timing 
qsR  = 0.4  1.04  -0.07  -0.27  0.97  0.77 
qsR  = 0.0  0.75  -0.18  -0.67  0.57  0.07 
qsn  = 1.0  1.49  0.09  0.33  1.58  I .82 
Housing demand  0.11  0.14  0.5  1  0.25  0.62 
Money demand  0.016  -0.05  -0.19  -0.03  -0.17 
Debt service  n.a.  -0.10  -0.38  -0.10  -0.38 
Total 
vsR  = 0.4  1.17  -0.09  -0.33  1.09  0.84 
-qSR = 0.0  0.87  -0.19  -0.73  0.68  0.14 
TSR  = 1.0  1.61  0.07  0.27  1.69  1.89 
Note: See note to table 4.1 
Table 4.3  U.K. Sacrifice Ratios 
Period of Downturn  Ratio 
1961:  1-63:3  1.9 
1965:2-66:3  0.0" 
1975:  1-78:2  0.9 
1980:2-83:3  0.3",  O.gb 
1984:2-86:3  0.9 
Average  0.8" 
1990:3-94:4  2.gb 
Note: Quarterly data. One reason for the difference between the two estimates for the 1980  down- 
turn is that we use RPIX inflation rather than the RPI series used by Ball. 
"From Ball (1994). 
bAuthors' estimates. 
structural reforms in the United Kingdom in the 1980s-in  particular in the 
labor market-may  have led to a change in the short-run trade-off between 
inflation  (wages) and output (unernpl~yment).~  Ball's  last estimate for the 
United Kingdom relates to the period 1984-86 and is thus unlikely to capture 
these changes. Moreover, his latest estimates may be distorted by two supply 
shocks at either end of  the sample: the 1984 miners'  strike and the 1986 oil 
price shock. Further, the estimated trade-off might be different-less  favor- 
9.  Other  methodological  questions  are raised in Cecchetti  (1994)  and Mayes and Chapple 
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able-at  the lower rates of inflation prevailing in the 1990s, compared to the 
1970s and 1980s.1° Recognizing this, we used Ball's approach to calculate an 
updated estimate of the sacrifice ratio for the most recent disinflationary epi- 
sode in the United Kingdom, 1990:3-94:4.  As shown in table 4.3, the ratio is 
considerably higher than earlier estimates, suggesting around a 3 percent out- 
put loss for each percentage point reduction in inflation. This is consistent with 
the notion of  a flatter Phillips curve at lower rates of  inflation and is more in 
line with the U.S. evidence. 
4.2.2  Breakeven Benefits from Price Stability 
If we take these estimates at face value, the cost of reducing inflation by 2 
percentage points in the United Kingdom would be around 6 percent of annual 
output, close to Ball's U.S. estimates. With this cost estimate, we  can then 
calculate the welfare gain (as a percentage of initial GDP) necessary to coun- 
terbalance this cost on the assumptions (a) that the welfare gain accrues in- 
definitely into the future, (b) that any future gains are discounted to give us a 
present value, and (c) that following Feldstein (1979) we make an allowance 
for growth effects-the  fact that the level of the GDP base on which the wel- 
fare cost is being calculated grows over time. The net benefit (B,  as a percent- 
age of initial GDP) that ensures that disinflationary costs (C,  also as a percent- 
age of  initial GDP) are exactly counterbalanced-the  breakeven benefit-is 
given by 
(1)  B  =  C*(r - g), 
where I  is the discount rate and g is the steady state growth rate of the economy. 
Real growth in the U.K. economy over the past 25 years has averaged around 
2 percent (g = 0.02)." For the discount rate, following Feldstein (1997b), we 
take the average net-of-tax real rate of return that an individual investor earned 
on a risky equity portfolio (the FT-SE All-Industrials Index) between 1970 and 
1995.12  Over this period, the FT-SEAll-Industrials Index rose by  10.6 percent 
in nominal terms, with an average dividend yield of 4.9 percent. We  need to 
adjust both dividend and capital gains income for taxes. For dividends, we 
assume an average marginal tax rate of  28.7 percent over the period.I3 For 
capital gains, we assume that realized gains are subject to the higher capital 
gains tax rate of 40 percent-that  most capital gain investment income accrues 
10. We  discuss in greater detail below the evidence on such Phillips curve convexities. 
11. Real growth should perhaps be defined on a per capita basis, but that would make little 
difference to our estimate here because the U.K. population has been steady over the period. 
12. The choice of period over which to average is in some sense arbitrary. 
13. To  simplify calculations we use the  1995 tax system as a base. The marginal tax rate is 
calculated using Inland Revenue data for this year and the methodology in Robson (1988). It would 
have been costly to calculate an average of marginal tax rates operating in every year between 1970 
and  1995. Our approach is likely to lead to a conservative estimate of  the discount rate if, on 
average, tax rates in 1995 were lower than those over the period as a whole. However, this approach 
may provide a better estimate of the discount rate to apply when discountingfuture welfare gains. 140  Hasan Bakhshi, Andrew G. Haldane, and Neal Hatch 
to higher rate income tax payers. But we need to make two further adjustments 
to the marginal tax rate on capital gains to arrive at an effective marginal tax 
rate. First, capital gains tax is indexed in the United Kingdom, so it is only real 
capital gains that are subject to tax. Second, we need to make an adjustment 
for the f6,000 annual exemption limit on capital gains and for the fact that 
gains accrued but unrealized at death are exempt from capital gains tax.I4 The 
Inland Revenue publishes estimates of  the tax revenue lost through the two 
exemptions and the indexation allowance.  Adding these to actual capital gains 
tax revenue and using the 40 percent marginal tax rate allows us to derive an 
estimate of the underlying total capital gain. When combined with the actual 
figure for capital gains tax revenue, this provides an estimate of the effective 
capital gains tax rate. Using data for financial year 1994/95 gives an effective 
tax rate on capital gains of  14.1 percent, which is similar to Feldstein’s estimate 
of  10 percent. Finally, note that RPIX inflation averaged 8.6 percent over the 
period 1970-95. Netting off the measurement bias thus gives a “true” inflation 
rate of 7.3 percent. Our estimate of the discount rate is then r = 5.3 percent 
((1 - 0.141)10.6 + (1 - 0.287)4.9 - 7.3), again not  too different from 
Feldstein’s US. estimate. 
From equation (l), this higher estimate of the discount rate, taken together 
with the United Kingdom’s lower average real growth rate than the United 
States, raises the breakeven benefit, B,  necessary to offset disinflationary costs. 
For the United Kingdom the breakeven benefit is 0.18 percent of GDP, com- 
pared with 0.16 percent in Feldstein’s study. 
4.2.3  Some Sensitivity Analysis 
There are obviously risks to this present value calculus; it is sensitive to the 
underlying assumptions regarding r, g,  and C. Particular risks attach to esti- 
mates of  r and C.  On discount rates, at one extreme Ramsey (1928) argued 
that any discounting of the utility of future generations was “ethically indefen- 
sible”-in  which case the net benefits of moving to price stability would be 
infinite. At the other extreme, it is well known that firms in the United King- 
dom often discount future income streams at much higher rates than would be 
implied by  returns on the stock market (Wardlow  1994). Our discount rate 
estimate steers a-conservative-middle  course between these extremes by 
taking a risky real return as a benchmark. 
Just how conservative this discount rate estimate is can be gauged by look- 
ing at two alternatives. For example, it could be argued that the appropriate 
real return is one on a debt and equity, rather than a pure equity, portfolio. Over 
the period 1970-95, the real after-tax return to government bonds in the United 
Kingdom was only 0.2 percent.I5  That would drag down markedly the implied 
discount rate for any plausible personal sector asset-gearing ratio. Alterna- 
tively,  following Feldstein (1993, we might derive a discount rate directly 
14. Though not from inheritance tax; but this has a much higher exemption limit. 
15. Calculated using redemption yields rather than holding period returns. 141  Some Costs and Benefits of Price Stability in the United Kingdom 
from the utility function. For example, assuming constant elasticity of substitu- 
tion (CES) preferences and equating the discount rate with the marginal rate 
of substitution of consumption over time, it follows that 
(2)  1 +  r  = (1 +  w - n)T, 
where y is the elasticity of marginal utility and w and n are steady state aggre- 
gate wage and population growth. Taking y = 2 from Feldstein (1995) and 
plugging in values for w and n gives r = 3.2 percent, similar to Feldstein's U.S. 
estimate of  3.0 percent. This again would imply a much larger-and  poten- 
tially infinite-present  value of welfare gains. In sum, the risks to our welfare 
estimates from the discount rate appear clearly to lie on the upside. 
Another area of particular uncertainty-most  likely working in the opposite 
direction-is  the cost estimate, C.  There are theoretical arguments, and some 
empirical evidence, to suggest Ball's  estimates may  understate the costs of 
transitioning to price stability. There are at least two such transition costs. First, 
as illustrated in table 4.3, temporary disinflationary costs may be higher at 
lower rates of  inflation. That would imply that even the 1990s sacrifice ratio 
for the United Kingdom may be an understatement of the true output costs of 
achieving price stability. Several strands of  empirical evidence point in this 
direction. For example, Laxton, Meredith, and Rose (1995) find strong evi- 
dence of Phillips curve convexities among G-7 countries. And a similar result 
emerges from the work of Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988), looking at a cross 
section of 43 industrialized countries.I6  Indeed, Ball's  (1994) own work finds 
some (albeit weak) evidence of the initial level of inflation affecting the size 
of the sacrifice ratio. 
It  is unclear,' theoretically, why  such asymmetries may  exist, and hence 
whether they are likely to survive a shift in inflation regime. For example, 
rigidities in prices and wages-due,  say, to psychological or legal impediments 
to nominal wage cuts-could  explain Phillips curve convexitie~.'~  But these 
may  well disappear if  a shift to price stability is deemed credible. Other- 
real-rigidities  may be more entrenched. One way of gauging possible Phillips 
curve convexities in a regime approximating price stability is to look at pre- 
World War  I1 historical evidence. Figure 4.1, for example, is a simple scat- 
terplot of inflation-growth outcomes over the period 1831-1938  in the United 
Kingdom, together with a second-order polynomial line of  best  fit.18  While 
16. E.g., table 8 of Ball et al. (1988) suggests that the output-inflation trade-off (and hence the 
implied sacrifice ratio) doubles between inflation rates of 5 percent-close  to the historical mean 
for the United Kingdom over the sample-and  zero. Yates and Chapple (1996) confirm this result 
using a more general formulation of the empirical output-inflation relationship. 
17. Though North American and U.K. evidence on the distribution of prices and earnings finds 
mixed support for such a proposition: see Yates (1995) for a summary. Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 
(1996) present evidence to suggest that the distribution of  wage settlements in the United States 
is truncated below zero. 
18. Higher order polynomial terms added nothing to the fit. Because we are attempting to fit an 
aggregate supply curve, we have crudely attempted to purge the data of supply shocks by removing 
observations where the changes in price level and output are oppositely signed. 142  Hasan Bakhshi, Andrew G. Haldane, and Neal Hatch 
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Fig. 4.1  U.K. Phillips curve, 1831-1938 
there is some evidence of convexity, the degree of curvature is not great enough 
to suggest that our transitional cost estimates are a significant understatement. 
A second potential cost of transitioning to price stability, which goes un- 
quantified by Ball’s (1994) analysis, is hysteresis-permanent-effects  on out- 
The empirical evidence on hysteresis effects has been equivocal. But a 
recent paper by  Ball (1997) himself presents cross-sectional evidence to sug- 
gest that hysteretic effects on the NAIRU may have been both commonplace 
and large during recent disinflations among the OECD countries. On the as- 
sumption that any disinflation has a permanent effect on the level of  output, 
the breakeven benefit becomes 
(3)  B  =  C*(r - g) +  D, 
where D  is the effect of a disinflation on the natural level of output. If we take 
Ball’s  (1997) cross-sectional estimates at face value, each percentage point of 
disinflation is associated with a 0.42 percentage point rise in the NAIRU (Ball 
1997, table 4.2). Taking a (conservative) estimate of Okun’s law coefficient of 
2, this would imply a 1.7 percent fall in the level of output for a 2 percentage 
19. See, eg,  Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) and more recently Akerlof et al. (1996) 143  Some Costs and Benefits of  Price Stability in the United Kingdom 
Costs of disinflation (as a percentage of GDP) 
0.5F.6 
0.1 0.5  0.9 1.3 1.7  2.1 2.5  2.9  3.3  3.7 4.1 4.5 4.9  5.3 5.7 
Discount rate minus GDP growth rate (per cent) 
Fig. 4.2  Breakeven welfare benefits (percent of GDP) 
point disinflation.20  This then raises the breakeven benefit to around 1.9 per- 
cent, possibly exceeding the benefits Feldstein finds for the United States. This 
hysteresis estimate is no doubt an upper bound. Over the 1980s, Ball's estimate 
of the U.K. NAIRU rose by  1.1 percentage points, while inflation fell by  8.5 
percentage points over the same period. This would imply a much lower hys- 
teresis coefficient of maybe 0.1 in the United Kingdom, though even this would 
raise the breakeven benefit to just under 0.6 percent. Further, it could be that 
Ball is picking up highly persistent, rather than permanent effects from disin- 
flation on the NAIRU.21  The present value of these losses would then be over- 
stated. But notwithstanding these caveats, it is clear that hysteresis effects, even 
if  modest, have the potential to alter radically any cost-benefit evaluation of 
price stability.22 
The above are indicative of the risks to the cost-benefit calculus. Figure 4.2 
20. Ball (1997) also allows for multiplicative effects with the duration of unemployment benefits 
(table 4.4).  Making an allowance for this effect raises the effect of  disinflation on the level of 
output to 2 percentage points in the United Kingdom because of the greater duration of  U.K. 
unemployment benefits. 
21. E.g., because even discouraged and deskilled workers will exit the labor force at some stage, 
through death or  retirement. 
22. There may be costs to operating at, as well as transitioning to, price stability, such as the 
nonnegativity constraint imposed on real interest rates (Summers 199  1). What little evidence there 
is suggests that the Summers constraint only rarely binds in a costly way  (Fuhrer and Madigan 
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conducts some sensitivity analysis of the breakeven benefit under different as- 
sumptions about the disinflationary costs, C, and the discount rate, r. Intu- 
itively, the more GDP lost for each percentage point reduction in inflation, the 
higher the welfare benefit required to make disinflation worthwhile. Similarly, 
the higher the discount rate, the higher the welfare benefit required. To take a 
specific example, assume welfare gains of 0.2 percent of GDP (as we calculate 
later in the paper). A welfare gain of 0.2 percent of GDP corresponds to the 
second thick line from the left. For any pair of parameter values lying in the 
two areas below the line, welfare benefits of 0.2 percent would suffice to offset 
disinflationary costs. So even with high estimates of the output costs of disin- 
flation-say,  6 percent of a year’s output lost for a 2 percentage point reduction 
in inflation-the  welfare benefits of reducing inflation exceed the output costs 
of doing so. 
4.3  Infiation and the Intertemporal Allocation of Consumption 
4.3.1  Distortions to Saving Behavior 
Households make two main expenditure decisions: how much to consume 
and how much to invest in each period. This section focuses on how household 
consumption decisions are affected by inflation; the next section considers the 
impact of inflation on housing investment decisions. 
Feldstein (1997b) derives the welfare gain from reducing inflation in a two- 
period consumption model. Individuals are given an  initial endowment and 
then decide how much to save in the first period in order to consume when 
they retire in the second period. Agents’ first-period savings earn a real rate of 
return. So the period 1 price of retirement consumption (p)  can be thought to 
be inversely related to this rate of return; the higher the return on savings, the 
cheaper the effective price of retirement consumption. It is here that inflation 
and the tax system come into play. Taxes drive a wedge between the pretax rate 
of return-which  is assumed to be invariant under inflation-and  the posttax 
return that households earn. Higher inflation raises the tax wedge and reduces 
the effective (real) posttax return to saving. This lowers retirement consump- 
tion from its (zero tax, zero inflation) optimum, with corresponding welfare 
implications. Rather than reproduce the basic arguments and calculations here, 
the gain to households from increased retirement consumption resulting from 
a reduction in inflation is simply stated here as equation (4) (see Feldstein 
1997b, eq. [4] and fig. 3.1): 
wherep, is the price of retirement consumption at zero inflation with no distor- 
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with zero inflation, and p2  is the price evaluated under the current tax regime 
with 2 percent inflation; S,  represents the initial gross saving of individuals at 
the early stage of their life cycles; qs, is the uncompensated elasticity of saving 
with respect to the price of retirement consumption; and u  is the propensity to 
save out of exogenous income. The welfare gain associated with a reduction of 
inflation (and hence with a reduction in the retirement price p2 -  p,)  is the area 
under the compensated demand curve, the trapezoid C + D in figure 4.3. To 
evaluate equation (4), we first need a measure of the price of retirement con- 
sumption. Feldstein (1997b) calculates this as (1 + r)-T,  where r is the real 
posttax rate of return and T is the number of years that agents engage in saving 
for retirement. Following Feldstein, we take T = 30 years.23 
To calculate po  we require a pretax rate of return to capital for U.K. industrial 
and commercial corporations. Such data are published by the U.K. Office for 
National Statistics. Between 1970 and 1995, this real rate of  return averaged 
8.2 percent. It is slightly below returns in the United States.24  Using OECD 
data as a cross check confirms that returns to capital in the United Kingdom 
23. All subsequent calculations are based on estimates up to and including 1995, the last year 
for which we have a full set of data. A number of changes to the tax system have been announced 
since 1995 but have not been taken into account. 
24. As in Feldstein, the capital stock is defined net of  depreciation; pretax profits are gross of 
interest payments, but unlike Feldstein, no attempt has yet been made to gross up for property 
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Table 4.4  Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) and Mainstream Corporation 
Tax (MCT) 
Taxable profits  €100 
Liability to CT  €33 
Corporation tax (CT) rate  33% 
ACT rate  25  % 
Dividend paid  €40 
Payments of MCT 
Payments of ACT  €10 (0.25*40) 
€23 (33-  10) 
have on average been below those in the United States over the past 30 years. 
Translating the estimated pretax return into a price of  retirement consumption 
in the absence of taxes, po = (1  .082)-30  = 0.094. 
To estimate a real return to saving in a world of taxes and inflation, we need 
to adjust the above figures for both corporate and personal sector taxes. The 
United States operates a “classical” tax system under which dividends are 
taxed twice, once as profits at the corporate level and again as income at the 
personal level. By contrast, the United Kingdom operates an imputation tax 
system  that  provides protection  against the  double  taxation of  dividends 
through a system of advance corporation tax (ACT). When dividends are paid 
to individuals the companies pay ACT, currently 20 percent of gross dividends 
(25 percent of  net dividends), but can use this payment to offset their later 
liability to mainstream corporation tax (MCT).25  Individuals can then use this 
payment against their total tax liability at the end of the financial year. Individ- 
uals who have  marginal tax rates above or below the ACT rate will incur a 
credit or debit accordingly. An example illustrates the imputation system (see 
table 4.4). 
In our calculations we take payments of MCT having netted off ACT pay- 
ments (to prevent double counting). We  then deal with the taxation of  divi- 
dends at the personal level. These MCT payments amounted to some 22 per- 
cent of firms’ pretax profits in 1995. This tax ratio is not zero because not all 
profits are distributed and because corporate tax rates are on average generally 
higher than personal tax rates. Ceteris paribus, this leads to higher tax pay- 
ments the lower the dividend payout ratio. But the effective tax rate is still 
much lower than the corresponding U.S.  figure, reflecting the difference be- 
tween the U.S. (classical) and U.K. (imputation) systems of dividend taxation. 
Netting off this ratio leaves a posttax rate of return of 6.38 percent. (For further 
details of the U.K.  corporate tax system, see Kay and King 1990.) 
To arrive at a real posttax return for savers, we also need to take account of 
personal taxes. What we need for our policy simulations are measures of  the 
25. This means that a number of  firms each year have ACT credits outweighing their taxable 
income: they are “tax exhausted” (see, e.g., Devereux 1987). This tax credit typically gets carried 
forward. This gives rise to an asymmetry in the corporate tax system, but one that we ignore here. 147  Some Costs and Benefits of Price Stability in the United Kingdom 
currently effective marginal tax rates on capital income. But these effective 
marginal tax rates depend on how this income is received (dividends, capital 
gains, interest income) and the tax status of the individual. Feldstein proxies 
these effects by assuming an individual marginal tax rate of 25 percent across 
all sources of income. We look at one level of disaggregation, identifying sep- 
arately average marginal tax rates on interest income, dividends, and capital 
gains and then weighting these to give an individual marginal tax rate. At this 
stage we make no allowance for tax-exempt savings, which are important in 
the United Kingdom. We  assume, in effect, that marginal savings flow into 
taxable assets. But we return to this issue below, when we conduct some sensi- 
tivity analysis assuming a different-tax-exempt-margin. 
For dividends we begin by calculating an average marginal tax rate on divi- 
dends using Inland Revenue individual data for financial year 1994195 and the 
methodology in Robson (1988). This gives a headline tax rate of 28.7 percent. 
For interest income on corporate bonds we use a headline marginal tax rate of 
31.1 percent, again based on Inland Revenue figures for 1994195. The headline 
marginal tax rate on capital gains (on equity and bonds) is that used earlier 
when calculating the discount rate, 14.1 percent. 
For  the weights  on  dividends, capital gains, and bond interest  income, 
Feldstein assumes the same debt-equity split for persons as for companies. 
That amounts to assuming that the corporate sector is owned directly by house- 
holds. This assumption is, in turn, only valid under three conditions: first, when 
open economy considerations are unimportant; second,  when there  are no 
debt-equity transformations through financial intermediation; and third, when 
personal sector net banking assets are counterbalanced by  their net banking 
liabilities, so that bank loans to companies are not backed by household saving. 
For the United States, a relatively closed economy where many debt and equity 
holdings are direct, these are reasonable approximations. 
But the U.K. situation is rather different. Overseas holdings of U.K. com- 
pany  securities amounted  to  over  18 percent of  these companies’ balance 
sheets in 1995; while around 5 percent of the personal sector’s equity holdings 
were with overseas companies. Further, the majority of households’ equity and 
debt holdings are indirect-through  pension funds, unit trusts, and the like- 
which may transform corporate debt to equity or vice versa. To overcome these 
problems, we take the debt-equity split directly from the personal sector’s bal- 
ance sheet by explicitly identifying their (direct and indirect) holdings of U.K. 
companies’ capital using sectoral flow-of-funds data. That negates the prob- 
lems of overseas holdings of company capital and possible debt-equity trans- 
formations of  assets as they pass from the corporate to the personal sector. 
Doing this gives a 9515 split of personal sector nonbank assets between equity 
and debt.26  We  then use this asset split when accounting for the incidence of 
26. If  we use instead the U.K. corporate sector’s balance sheet to infer a equity-debt ratio for 
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personal taxation on corporate bonds and equity. For the split between divi- 
dends (interest) and capital gains of equity (bond) income, we assume that in- 
dividuals receive income from dividends (interest) and capital gains in broadly 
the same ratio used in our discount rate calculation, roughly 60/40. 
But to the extent that the personal sector’s net banking assets are also indi- 
rectly financing U.K. companies’ bank loans, we need to take account of these 
Feldstein sidesteps this problem by assuming that household bank depos- 
its and bank loans are offsetting. U.K. companies held net banking liabilities 
of around E60 billion in 1995. Because of the nature of  banking, it is impos- 
sible to say which of these were financed from personal sector deposits and 
which from other sources; but if we assume that net bank loans to companies 
were effectively financed from personal deposits, we can calculate a marginal 
effective personal tax rate inclusive of the banking sector.28  The weights in the 
personal sector’s balance sheet are then 518916 for corporate bonds, equity, and 
deposits, respecti~ely.~~  For the average marginal tax rate on deposits we apply 
a rate of  23.6 percent, comprising a 26.2 percent tax rate on interest-bearing 
deposits and, trivially, a zero rate on non-interest-bearing deposits. 
Using these weights and our adjusted average marginal tax rates gives us a 
total effective marginal individual tax rate of 23.0 percent. This implies a real 
net rate of return to savers in the United Kingdom of around 4.9 percent, which 
corresponds to a price of retirement consumption of 0.237 evaluated at 2 per- 
cent inflation. The wedge between pre- and posttax returns in the United King- 
dom (3.3 percent) is around two-thirds that in the U.S. case (5.13 percent). 
This largely reflects the effects of ACT. 
We now calculate the effect on the posttax real return to saving-and  hence 
on the price of retirement consumption-of  a reduction in inflation of 2 per- 
centage points. Work in the United Kingdom, along similar lines to that in the 
United States, has shown that inflation tends to increase effective tax rates for 
both the personal and corporate sectors. For companies, this inflation nonneu- 
trality in the U.K. tax system has three sources. First, since 1984 U.K. compa- 
nies have received no stock relief; that is, any nominal capital gains made on 
inventories as a result of general price level rises are treated as taxable profit. 
Second, depreciation allowances are based on historic cost asset valuations and 
are thus reduced in real terms by  inflation. And, third, acting against the first 
two effects is the fact that nominal debt interest payments are tax ded~ctible.~~ 
Bond, Devereux, and Freeman (1990) calibrate these inflation nonneutralit- 
ies using microlevel data drawn from company accounts. They estimate that 
27. We are only interested here in the savings channel running from households to companies, 
so personal sector assets that are backing non-U.K.-corporate liabilities are not included in the 
calculations-e.g.,  household holdings of government debt or foreign debt and equity. 
28. We discuss variants on this assumption in the sensitivities section below. 
29. There is an argument for basing the weights on gross rather than net banking liabilities. 
Using gross liabilities changes the weights to 4/81/15, but this does not appear to have a very 
significant effect on the estimates of the welfare gain. 
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moving from 10 percent inflation to price stability is associated with a decrease 
in companies’ effective tax rate of over one-third. Making an assumption about 
the initial pretax rate of return and assuming a fixed capital stock, we can trans- 
late this ready-reckoner into an effect of inflation on companies’ profit rates. 
The rule of thumb we use, based on Bond et al. (1990), is that a 1 percentage 
point fall in inflation is associated with a 0.37 percentage point rise in the 
taxable profit rate.31  We take the average marginal corporation tax rate to be 32 
percent, based on Inland Revenue data.32  The effect of a 2 percentage point re- 
duction in inflation is hence to raise the posttax return to  savers by  0.32* 
0.37*0.02 = 0.0024 (0.24 percentage points) as a result of corporation tax non- 
neutralities. That is, the rate of return after corporate taxes is raised from 6.38 
to 6.62 percent. 
The effect of  inflation on households’ effective tax rates depends on the 
debt-equity-deposit composition of their asset portfolios. We assume the same 
weights as earlier. For equity holdings, one key difference from the United 
States is that since 1985 capital gains in the United Kingdom have been in- 
dexed. This effectively neutralizes any effect from a change in inflation on 
equity income.33  Taken alongside the  higher proportion  of  equity in  U.K. 
households’  portfolios,  this  reduces  substantially the  fall  in  effective tax 
rates-and  hence the rise in posttax saving rates-induced  by  a fall in in- 
flation. 
But a change in inflation does affect marginal tax rates on deposits and cor- 
porate debt because it is nominal interest income that is taxed. For deposits 
and for debt, we use our earlier average marginal effective tax rates of  23.6 
and 3 1.1 percent, respectively. Taking these debt and deposit nonneutralities 
together, this gives a 0.06 percentage point reduction in the effective tax rate 
for a 2 percentage point fall in inflation. This then raises the posttax rate of 
return to individuals to 5.16 percent and implies that the price of retirement 
consumption falls to pI = 0.22 when inflation is zero. In the United Kingdom 
the move to price stability has less effect on the posttax saving rate (around 
0.24 percentage points) than  in  the United  States (around 0.49 percentage 
31. If a 1 percentage point rise in inflation lowers tax liabilities by 3.7 percent, then, for fixed 
capital stock, this is equivalent to a 3.7 percent rise in the profit rate. The pretax return to capital 
in 1989-the  year when Bond et al. (1990) do their analysis-was  around 10 percent. Hence, a 1 
percentage point rise in inflation implies an increase in the profit rate of 0.37 percentage points. 
This ready-reckoner takes account of all three tax nonneutralities simultaneously, whereas Feld- 
stein looks at them separately. We can identify separately the debt interest deductibility effect to 
ensure our estimates are not too wayward. With debt 21 percent of Industrial Commercial Compa- 
nies’ capital and a marginal corporate tax rate of 32 percent, a 2 percentage point fall in inflation 
raises the effective corporate tax rate by 0.32*0.21*0.02 = 0.0013 (or 0.13 percentage points). 
That would imply an effect on the effective tax rate from the lack of indexation of depreciation 
allowances and stock relief of 0.5 percentage points, not too dissimilar to the 0.57 percentage 
point depreciation nonneutrality used by Feldstein. 
32. This is a weighted average of the 33 percent headline MCT rate and the 25 percent reduced 
rate for small firms. 
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Table 4.5  Saving Ratios in the United States and United Kingdom, 1990 
Age CQhort  United States  United Kingdom 
3 1-35  7.1  8.0 
36-40  9.4  12.0 
4 1-45  9.8  12.0 
46-50  11.2  11.0 
5 1-55  13.9  10.0 
56-60  16.6  13.0 
Sources: Attanasio (1994) and Banks and Blundell(1994). 
points). This is due largely to the indexation of capital gains and the greater 
importance of  equity as a source of  personal sector income in  the United 
Kingdom. 
The price of retirement consumption under the various tax and inflation as- 
sumptions (p,,  p,, and p,) can now be substituted into equation (4) to give 
(5)  G,  =  0.038S2(1  - qs, - a). 
To evaluate equation (3,  we need an estimate of the saving of the young at an 
inflation rate of  2 percent (S,).  Feldstein derives an estimate from the steady 
state relationship between  savers and  dissavers implied by  the  two-period 
model. He shows that the saving of the young is (1 + n + g)'  times the saving 
of the older generation, where n is the rate of population growth and g is the 
growth in per capita wages. If we follow that approach, real aggregate wage 
growth in the United Kingdom between 1970 and 1995 was 2 percent, some- 
what lower than in the United States. Taking n + g = 0.02 and T = 30 implies 
that the saving of the young is around 2.23 times the net personal saving rate. 
Given an average U.K. personal saving rate of 9.2 percent of  GDP between 
1970 and 1995, this implies that S,  is around 21 percent of  GDP, more than 
double the U.S. figure. 
This figure for gross saving seems high.34  So we also considered some com- 
plementary microevidence from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey and 
the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey (FES). Table 4.5 shows the saving ratios 
in  1990 of  a set of population cohorts spanning the age range 30-60  in the 
United States (from Attanasio 1994) and the United Kingdom (Banks and 
Blundell 1994). This is the age range likely to match most closely with the 
theoretical notion of first-period savers because the very young are likely to be 
net borrowers and the very old gross dissavers. 
34. lbo  possible reasons for this are, first, that our aggregate real wage growth assumption is 
too low-certainly,  real wage growth is higher (around 2.5 percent) if we extend our data back to 
the 1960s-and,  second, that our net saving ratio is too high. One cause of the latter is that our 
saving ratio is not inflation adjusted and average inflation over the sample has been higher than 
our 2 percent benchmark. An  inflation-adjusted saving ratio would, over the  1980s, have been 
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Table 4.5 suggests two things.3J  First, there is little difference between sav- 
ing ratios in the United Kingdom and the United States over the 30-60  age 
range; they both average around 11 percent. And, second, the U.K. saving ratio 
of  the young is nearer to  10 percent than to the 21 percent implied by  the 
macroestimates above. In what follows we  use a lower implied estimate of 
gross saving (S, = 0.1 l), which seems more consistent with micro- and inter- 
national evidence. Feldstein further assumes that the propensity to save out of 
exogenous income is the same as that out of earned income and that average 
and marginal saving propensities can be  conflated. On  these assumptions, 
given that earnings from employment are some 63 percent of  GDP in the 
United Kingdom and (T = S,/0.63, it follows that u = 0.17. 
The final piece in the jigsaw is the elasticity of  saving with respect to real 
interest rates.36  There is a good deal of academic controversy over this issue. 
Feldstein uses Boskin’s (1978) work in the United States, which finds the elas- 
ticity to be around 0.4. Boskin’s approach is to take the interest semielasticity 
from a standard consumption function and then infer from this the full interest 
elasticity of  saving. On  the assumption of  fixed income, the full and semi- 
elasticities are linked by 
(6)  qSR -  - -  (R  * c)/sgcR, 
where C, S, and R denote consumption, saving, and the real interest rate, re- 
spectively, a bar denotes a mean value, and 5,  is the real interest rate semi- 
elasticity of consumption. To arrive at an estimate of qsR  for the United King- 
dom, we take ECR from a range of recently estimated consumption functions in 
the United Kingdom (Muellbauer and Murphy 1993; Bayoumi 1993; Fisher 
and Whitley, f~rthcoming)~~  and then convert them using equation (6) into sav- 
ing elasticities. Most of the above studies imply saving elasticities fairly close 
to zero. So we take qsR  = 0 as our central guess but also consider qsR  = 0.2 
and qsR  = 0.4 for comparability with Feldstein. 
While our central assumption may  seem extreme, there is a good deal of 
theoretical as well as empirical support for it. With CES preferences, a positive 
saving elasticity only obtains in a two-period model when the intertemporal 
elasticity of  substitution exceeds  And most empirical studies of  the 
elasticity of  substitution put it closer to zero than to unity (e.g., Hall 1988); 
certainly, there is little to suggest it is greater than unity. This implies that a 
zero saving elasticity-where  income and substitution effects are broadly off- 
setting-is  a reasonable central guess. Moreover, while a zero saving elasticity 
___ 
35. One potential problem with the FES data set is that it is known to undersample high-income 
households. That, in turn, would depress the average saving ratio. But in 1990 the aggregate saving 
ratio in the United Kingdom was in line with the average reported by the FES. 
36. It can be shown that qsR  = -RTvsJ(l  + R). 
37. Though only the first of these studies uses posftax real interest rates. 
38. E.g., with Cobb-Douglas preferences in a two-period model, qsr  = 0.4, and r = 4 percent, 
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lowers the direct welfare costs calculated below, it certainly does not eliminate 
them. A larger part of the welfare gain is the result of a direct price effect of 
cheaper retirement consumption on the quantity of consumption purchased. 
Using the above estimates of the saving elasticity, adjusted so that it is ex- 
pressed as an elasticity of the price of retirement con~umption,'~  together with 
our previous calculations, we can compute the overall gain from moving to 
price stability. Using equation (5),  we estimate the gain to be GI = 0.35 percent 
of  GDP with qsR  = 0 when S,  = 0.11. At qsR  = 0.2, GI = 0.40 percent of 
GDP; at qsR  = 0.4, GI = 0.46 percent of  GDP. All of  these direct welfare 
costs are considerably smaller than in Feldstein. For example, if one makes the 
comparable assumption of qsR  = 0 for the United States, the gain would be 
some 0.75 percent of GDP. In large part this is due to the lesser susceptibility 
of the U.K. tax system to inflation-induced distortions. 
4.3.2  Indirect Revenue Effects 
Next we consider the effect on government revenue of the above experiment. 
The working assumption here, as in Feldstein (1997b), is that any effect of  a 
move to price stability on government revenues cannot be made good by a rise 
in lump-sum taxes. Instead, distortionary taxes are required to fill any financing 
gap, with corresponding welfare implications. 
Assume we start from a price of retirement income p2  and consumption level 
C, (see fig. 4.3) with inflation at 2 percent and the current tax system in place. 
Now consider lowering the inflation rate to zero. There are two offsetting ef- 
fects on revenue. First, lower inflation raises the real return to saving and hence 
lowers the price of retirement consumption to pi.  This results in a loss of reve- 
nue equal to (p, -  p,)C,.  Against this, the lower price of retirement consump- 
tion stimulates higher consumption (C, -  C,) that is in turn revenue generating 
by an amount (p, -  po)(C, -  C,).  The aggregate change in revenue is 
(7)  dREV = S,{[(P, -  PO)/P,I[(P,  -  PI)/P~I(I -  qsp) -  (P, -  P,)/P2I* 
This expression can in principle be either positive or negative. But with qsR  = 
0, and  substituting in earlier parameter values,  we  get a net revenue loss, 
dREV = 0.34 percent of GDP. The corresponding net revenue losses at qsR  = 
0.2 and qsR  = 0.4 are 0.29 and 0.23 percent of GDP, respectively. These are 
typically much  larger than  Feldstein's  U.S.  numbers, in  part owing to  the 
United Kingdom's higher gross saving ratio and in part the result of our lower 
assumed interest elasticity of saving. 
We  can map this change in revenue into a change in welfare by  scaling it 
using a deadweight loss coefficient,  A. This measures the marginal deadweight 
loss of an across-the-board tax increase that raises one extra pound of revenue. 
Feldstein bases his estimate of  X on Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley's  (BSW 
39. This involves scaling by -(1  + R)/RT, where R is some benchmark saving rate. We take R 
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1985) computable general equilibrium model of the United States. BSW con- 
cluded, “The welfare loss from a 1 per cent increase in all distortionary taxes 
is in the range of  17 to 56 cents per dollar of extra revenue.” There are many 
reasons why such a X-range might be inaccurate for our exercise. For example, 
the BSW estimates refer to the United States and are based on a model that is 
calibrated on data drawn from  1973. More generally, A  can only really be 
pinned down by simulating the effects of a specific tax experiment in a general 
equilibrium model in which the existing configuration of distortionary taxes is 
fully set down  (see Ballard and Fullerton  1992): A  is not a fixed, policy- 
invariant parameter. But in the absence of such estimates for the United King- 
dom, we take as our benchmark two values of  X (X = 0.4, 1.5) as in Feldstein. 
This broadly covers the range of  estimates found in other recent studies of 
specific tax simulations (inter alia, Stuart 1984; Hansson and Stuart 1985; Ful- 
lerton and Henderson 1989). 
We  can go a little further toward justifying these values. Abel (1997) uses 
Sidrauski’s (1967) general equilibrium model to compute the welfare effects 
of eliminating inflation in the United States. He extends the model to include 
both housing and nonhousing capital, includes a government budget constraint, 
and endogenizes labor supply. We take Abel’s model and recalibrate it for U.K. 
data. It is then possible to arrive at an estimate of the deadweight loss parame- 
ter by  simulating the effects of a tax change on utility, subject to the govern- 
ment budget constraint being satisfied. We  conduct two experiments. In the 
first experiment, all three tax rates (on labor income, housing capital, and non- 
housing capital) are raised by  10 percent. There is a rise in overall tax revenue 
and a fall in consumption. Using the utility function, we then calculate the 
change in consumption necessary to maintain the new  level of  utility, with 
money and labor income (the other two arguments in the utility function) held 
at their base values. This yields an estimate of around C0.40 of welfare loss for 
every pound in revenue gained-a  X of around 0.4. As a second experiment, 
we raise all three taxes by  1 percentage point. The resulting estimate of the 
deadweight loss parameter is 0.37. Although the general equilibrium model we 
use is small and the calibrated results depend on a number of key parameters, 
there appears to be some support for a A estimate of around 0.4. This is taken 
as our central estimate below. 
The total welfare gain from the reduced distortion to consumption timing 
resulting from a 2 percentage point reduction in inflation is then 
(8)  G,  =  G, +  XdREV. 
As table 4.1 illustrates, assuming X = 0.4 the net welfare gain from price sta- 
bility operating through saving distortions is bounded between 0.21 and 0.37 
percent of GDP. This is around a quarter the size of Feldstein’s U.S. estimates. 
Much of the difference is due to offsetting revenue effects. This is shown up 
clearly when we raise the deadweight loss coefficient to A = 1.5. All net wel- 
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-0.6  -  -0.4 
‘Central estimate 
Fig. 4.4  Net welfare benefits from consumption (percent of  GDP) 
4.3.3  Some Sensitivity Analysis 
Figure 4.4 illustrates more generally the sensitivity of the welfare calcula- 
tions to different assumptions about the saving elasticity and deadweight loss 
parameter. For any given pair of parameter values, there is a point on the con- 
tour map that shows the size of the net welfare gain from a 2 percentage point 
reduction in inflation. It is evident that relatively small adjustments to the cen- 
tral assumptions-in  particular regarding the deadweight loss parameter-can 
markedly alter the estimated net welfare gain. But the net welfare benefit in 
the central case is still nontrivial, at around 0.2 percent of GDP, even when the 
saving elasticity is assumed to be low. 
There are further extensions and risks we might consider. First, Feldstein 
(1997b) points out that his calculations exclude current nonsavers. This is a 
potentially important omission if, first, nonsavers are a significant proportion 
of  the population and, second, they are responsive to changes in real interest 
rates. Were both conditions to be satisfied, the estimated welfare costs above 
could be a significant understatement, as they would miss the effect of higher 
real interest rates in inducing previous nonsavers to save. 
Using data from the  1991/92 Financial Research Survey of  6,600 house- 
holds in the United Kingdom, Banks, Dilnot, and Low (1994) found that over 
half of the households in the survey held gross financial assets of less than E455 
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whatsoever. These results suggest that as in the United Savers, nonsavers are 
nontrivial in number. How responsive these agents might be to changes in real 
interest rates is less clear. That depends on whether nonsaving is a voluntary 
decision (e.g., among young “life cycle” savers) or an involuntary one (e.g., 
among credit-constrained “Keynesian” consumers). The former set are likely 
to be interest sensitive; the latter set much less so. In fact, the saving elasticity 
we derived from the aggregate consumption functions already implicitly em- 
bodies the average effect of real interest rates on both savers and nonsavers. 
And  since our central case has qsR  = 0, this nonsaver effect is in any case 
likely to be quantitatively small. 
Second, the above calculations take no account of the depressing effect of 
increased saving on the marginal product of capital. This would tend to reduce 
estimated welfare gains; but the effect is small. For example, assuming Cobb- 
Douglas technology, the implied fall in the marginal product of capital is only 
0.06 percentage points when qsR  = 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points when qsR  = 
0.4. Of course, when qsR  = 0, our central case, the marginal product of capital 
is unchanged. These effects in turn translate into small welfare changes: for 
example, a fall of  0.0027GDP when qsR  = 0.2. Moreover, these losses are 
almost exactly counterbalanced by  the rise in the marginal product of  labor 
resulting from the rise in the capital stock. For example, this leads to an off- 
setting welfare gain of 0.0025GDP when qsR  = 0.2. So the net welfare effect 
of these production mix adjustments seems likely to be negligible. 
Third, more substantively, the stylized life cycle model makes no allowance 
for social security income received during retirement. Recognizing this exoge- 
nous source of  second-period income lowers the implied interest elasticity of 
saving by an amount (C -  B)/C (see Feldstein 1997a), where C is retirement 
consumption and B social security benefits. Taking BIC = 0.25, as in Feldstein, 
lowers the direct welfare gain by around 30 percent: for example, with qsR  = 
0 direct welfare gains fall from 0.35 to 0.25 percent of GDP. 
Fourth, our central case assumes that all net company bank loans are effec- 
tively financed from personal sector deposits. Assuming instead that company 
bank loans are financed from elsewhere-that  is, stripping out the banking 
system from our calculations-lowers  the welfare gain from around 0.21 to 
0.19 percent with qsR  = 0. 
Finally, the analysis so far has assumed that all marginal saving flows into 
taxable assets. In practice, a relatively high proportion of U.K. personal sector 
saving is held in tax-exempt forms. We  estimate that around 38 percent of 
personal sector equities are tax exempt (including pensions funds, pension 
business of life assurers, and personal equity plans-PEP~).~~  Direct holdings 
of equity that are taxed account for 37 percent. The remainder are equities held 
40. The tax treatment of  PEPS and pensions is not the same: in the former case, final receipts 
are tax deductible, whereas in the latter, initial contributions are tax deductible. We  ignore that 
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indirectly via non-tax-exempt unit trusts and the nonpension business of  life 
assurers (25 percent). Direct shareholdings are assumed to be taxed at the 
headline rate of 28.7 percent, and the remaining 25 percent of taxable holdings 
are taxed at 20 percent. Tax-exempt equity holdings are obviously taxed at a 
zero rate. So assuming that the marginal tax rate on equity holdings is the same 
as its average, this would give an adjusted average marginal tax rate of dividend 
income of 15.7 percent (0.38*0 -  0.37*28.7 + 0.25*0.20). 
Doing the same thing for deposits, we need to make an adjustment for tax- 
exempt special savings accounts (TESSAs). These made up 6 percent of total 
personal sector bank deposits in  1995. So the marginal tax rate on deposits, 
inclusive of  tax-exempt funds, would fall to 22 percent. Finally, for interest 
income on corporate bonds, we estimate that around 26 percent of personal 
sector holdings of  corporate bonds are held in tax-exempt vehicles (pension 
funds, corporate bond PEPS,  etc.). A further 68 percent are held by taxed insti- 
tutions, and 6 percent are held directly. Direct bondholdings are taxed at the 
3 1.1 percent headline rate, and non-tax-exempt unit trusts and the nonpension 
business of life assurers are assumed to be taxed at the basic rate of income 
tax.41  This gives an adjusted average marginal tax rate on bond interest of  19.0 
percent (0.26*0 + 0.06*0.311 + 0.68*0.25). 
The headline marginal tax rate on capital gains (on equity and bonds) is that 
used earlier when calculating the discount rate, 14.1 percent. But again, these 
capital gains will be earned on securities held in a range of saving outlets, and 
we assume the same distribution of holdings across these outlets as for divi- 
dends and bonds. Direct holdings are taxed at 14 percent, indirect holdings via 
non-tax-exempt unit trusts and the nonpension business of life assurers at the 
basic rate (25 percent in 1994/95), and tax-exempt holdings are tax free. This 
gives an adjusted marginal effective capital gains tax rate of  11.6 percent on 
equities and 17.9 percent on bonds. 
The effects of  the tax-exempt saving adjustments are significant. For ex- 
ample, the effective marginal individual tax rate after weighting dividends, 
bond interest, deposit income, and capital gains was 23.0 percent before ad- 
justment for tax-exempt saving. This falls to 14.8 percent after adjusting for 
tax-exempt saving. At qsR  = 0.2 and A = 0.4, the effect of tax-exempt saving 
is to reduce the net welfare gains by 0.07 percent of GDP to 0.14 percent; at 
qsR  = 0.2 and qsR  = 0.4, the reductions are 0.08 percent (to 0.21 percent) and 
0.13 percent (to 0.27 percent) of GDP, respectively. So the choice of destina- 
tion for marginal saving is clearly crucial to the welfare calculus. Indeed, if all 
saving flowed into tax-exempt vehicles, the welfare gain arising from the ef- 
fects of lower inflation on saving behavior would be zero. 
41. Policyholder and shareholder funds actually have  different tax treatments in  the United 
Kingdom: bond interest and capital gains on the former are taxed at the basic rate of income tax 
(and at a lower rate of  20 percent from April  1996),  whereas the latter are taxed at the higher 
corporation tax rate of 33 percent. In the absence of disaggregated data, our calculation assumes 
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But this would almost certainly overestimate the effects of tax-exempt sav- 
ings vehicles. For example, there are restrictions on the quantity of marginal 
saving that is allowed to flow into tax-exempt assets. And there are ceilings on 
the amount that can be invested in a TESSA and restrictions on the additional 
voluntary contributions (AVCs) that can flow into personal pensions. Further, 
ACT credits to pension funds were abolished with immediate effect in the July 
1997 budget. These institutional features help to justify the main case, under 
which saving flows into taxable assets. 
4.4  Inflation and Residential Investment 
4.4.1  Distortions to Housing Investment 
House prices in the United Kingdom have  been around 25 percent more 
volatile than the general level of prices since 1970. And U.K. house price in- 
flation has outstripped general price inflation by 2 percent per year on average 
over this period. Without question, the tax environment has played a role in 
this. The availability of mortgage interest relief-which  in the United King- 
dom is normally implemented through “mortgage interest relief  at source” 
(M1RAS)-has  meant that the tax system has consistently favored housing 
over alternative real and financial assets. More recently, there has been a pro- 
gressive scaling back of  the tax benefits available for owner-occupiers. The 
nominal ceiling on which relief is available has been raised only once since it 
was first introduced in 1974, while the effective rate of tax relief has also come 
down progressively over this period to its current rate of 15 percent (table 4.6). 
Indeed, one irony is that much of the reduction in the effective impact of mort- 
gage tax relief in the 1980s was achieved through the rise in house prices itself. 
This took the average value of a mortgage well above the &30,000  ceiling for 
mortgage relief. 
While it is widely perceived that distortionary tax benefits have led to a 
switch of resources toward housing, investment in dwellings is actually lower 
as a percentage of GDP, and the capital stock lower, in the United Kingdom 
Table 4.6  Changes in  Mortgage Interest Relief 
Pre-1974175 
1974175  Limit introduced of &25,000 
1983184 
1988189 
Mortgage interest relief given on the full amount of any loan 
Limit raised to E30.000, and relief given at source (MIRAS) 
Tax relief on new loans for home improvement withdrawn; 
limit of one claim on each property (home sharers were 
previously able to claim double tax relief) 
(25%) 
199  1  I92 
1994195 
1995196 
Higher rate relief abolished relief restricted to basic rate 
Rate of tax relief reduced to 20% 
Rate of tax relief reduced to 15% 158  Hasan Bakhshi, Andrew G. Haldane, and Neal Hatch 
Table 4.7  Value of Housing Stock, 1992 
Net Stock 
Grossa  Net“  per Capita 
(billion $)  (billion $)  ($) 
United Kingdom  1,425  919  15,845 
Australia  361  252  14,376 
United States  8,086  5,190  20,3  14 
Germanyh  3,280  2,252  36,286 
Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Flows and Stocks of Fixed 
Capital and Main Economic Indicators. 
“Calculations based on market exchange rates: E1.512 per US.  dollar, $1.6139 per deutsche mark, 
and $1.4513 per Australian dollar. 
hEstimate  for Western Germany. 
than  in  many  other countries (table 4.7). That perhaps  suggests that  tax- 
induced distortions to housing investment are not obviously more serious in 
the United Kingdom than elsewhere-a  conclusion borne out by  the welfare 
analysis that follows. 
The tax incentives offered by the MIRAS system in the United Kingdom 
lower the effective user cost of housing to owner-occupiers. Moreover, because 
relief is given on nominal interest payments, the effective extent of this tax 
relief rises with inflation, further lowering the user cost. This is identical to the 
situation in the United States. Its effect is to induce an overinvestment in hous- 
ing compared to a situation of zero inflation-where  tax distortions would be 
minimized-or  one where tax distortions were eliminated entirely. Figure 4.5 
illustrates these three situations. A “0” subscript denotes the no-tax outcome, 
a “1” subscript the zero-inflation outcome, and a “2” subscript the current (2 
percent inflation) outcome. As in the previous section, the deadweight distor- 
tion is equal to the area C + D. And the resulting gain from a reduction in 
inflation is (see Feldstein 1997b, eq. [19]) 
where the elasticity of housing with respect to the user cost, cHR  = -(R,/H,) 
(dH/dR)  . 
To  evaluate this expression we need to determine the three user costs, R,, 
R,, and R,. In a zero-tax world, the implied rental cost of housing per pound 
of housing capital is reduced to R, = p + m + 6 + t, where p is the pretax 
rate of  return (8.2 percent), m is the maintenance cost per pound of housing 
capital, tare transactions costs, and 6 is the rate of housing depreciation. 
For depreciation and maintenance costs, we  assume 0.8 percent per  an- 
num.4* We assume transactions costs are around 0.6 percent per annum (Rob- 
42. This is based on the figure of  1.4 percent contained in the 1995 report of the Retail Prices 
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Fig. 4.5  Residential investment 
inson and Skinner 1989; Woolwich Building Society 1996). This takes account 
of  stamp duty, legal and estate agent fees, and removal costs, written off over 
the lifetime of  a mortgage. So in sum we arrive at a figure of  1.4 percent, 
covering miscellaneous housing costs. This estimate is in line with those used 
by  Henry and'Pain (1994), Miles (1994), and Pain and Westaway (1996) for 
the United Kingdom. Using these values gives R, = 0.096 for the United King- 
dom, a user cost of 9.6 pence per pound of housing investment. This is some- 
what lower than calculated by Feldstein for the United States. 
Turning to a world with taxes, Feldstein uses an itemizerhonitemizer classi- 
fication of  owner-occupiers in the United States. The situation in the United 
Kingdom is somewhat different, but it is useful (as we demonstrate below) to 
make a similar distinction-between  that part of the mortgage stock subject to 
MIRAS below the E30,OOO ceiling and that proportion n0t.4~  The non-MIRAS 
mortgage stock will largely reflect the value of the outstanding mortgage stock 
that falls above the E30,OOO MIRAS ceiling. But it will also include mortgages 
pressed as a percentage of the value of the dwelling excluding land-needed  to make good deterio- 
ration and obsolescence. But the value of  land may be as much as half of the total price of a 
dwelling. This would tend to lower the percentage cost of maintenance and depreciation by around 
half, to around 0.7 percent. There is also some expenditure necessary to maintain the value of the 
land for each dwelling of, say, 0.1 percent per annum. 
43. The U.S. and U.K. distinctions are different. In the United States, nonitemizers get a lump 
sum of interest relief, whereas in the United Kingdom the non-MIRAS component gets no relief 
of any kind. Feldstein is able to ignore the lump-sum benefit to nonitemizers because it has no 
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on second properties, which are not eligible for tax relief. The MIRAShon- 
MIRAS distinction we make is clearly artificial but is nonetheless useful ana- 
lytically.44 
The average price of a house in the United Kingdom is E55,OOO according 
to Halifax Building Society figures. Even assuming a low mortgage-to-value 
ratio, this means that the majority of  new mortgages in the United Kingdom 
will exceed the ceiling. But it takes some time for the mortgage stock to turn 
over. So mortgages that do not exhaust the tax relief fully are still nontrivial in 
number and an important factor in the calculations below. For loans subject to 
MIRAS, the user cost of housing is 
+  m+  6+  t- r, 
where p is the mortgage-to-value ratio, 8 is the effective rate of tax relief, rn  is 
the real posttax rate of return on saving (calculated in the previous section),  i, 
is the interest rate paid on the mortgage, T~  is the rate of property tax, and r is 
house price inflation. 
The rate of tax relief (0) used in the calculations was 16 percent, which was 
the marginal rate of  MIRAS prevailing in  1995 for the value of  mortgages 
under the E30,OOO ceiling.45  The interest rate paid on building society mort- 
gages (im)  averaged 7.5 percent in 1995, when the (bias-adjusted) inflation rate 
was 1.6 percent. Thus the mortgage rates that would apply under zero and 2 
percent inflation would be 5.9 and 7.9 percent, respectively, on the assumption 
that the Fisher effect holds exactly. On property taxes (TJ,  the ratio of council 
tax payments to the value of  the housing stock was around 0.8 percent per 
annum in 1995. There is no tax relief on these payments, so cp  = 0. 
Finally, on the expected house price inflation term (T),  Feldstein assumes 
that house prices grow in line with the general price level. We do the same for 
consistency. It could be that a premium should be added to the inflation term, 
to reflect the fact that U.K. house prices have tended historically to grow faster 
than retail prices. But adding a constant to the user cost would have little im- 
pact on our calculations at the margin. 
In order to calculate the implicit rental rate, we need an estimate of  the 
mortgage-to-value ratio.  For new  business, this is around 70 percent. But 
44. There are various alternative ways of capturing the MIRAS limit. E.g., presentationally it 
might appear preferable to make a distinction between those households who claim MIRAS and 
those who do not. E.g., Hills (1991) calculates that 90 percent of the mortgage stock and some 22 
percent of all mortgages were above the f30,000 ceiling at the end of 1988. These figures will of 
course have increased since 1988, since when the MIRAS ceiling has been fixed in nominal terms. 
It is possible to use these as weights to calculate an effective rate of tax relief for all those who 
claim MIRAS, but the effective rate of tax relief would then vary systematically with the mortgage 
stock in response to any change in the rental price. 
45. Is.,  one-fourth of the tax rate in financial year 1994/95 (20 percent) and three-fourths of the 
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the average mortgage-to-value ratio for the outstanding mortgage stock will 
clearly be lower as, for example, loans are repaid through time. Aggregate 
mortgage and housing stock data suggest that the ratio is 35 percent. For loans 
qualifying for MIRAS, the ratio is likely to be higher than this average. We 
make a somewhat arbitrary assumption that the ratio is 60 percent. And using 
equation (lo), this then suggests that a combination of 2 percent inflation and 
the current tax regime would reduce the rental cost of housing from around 9.6 
pence to around 6.9 pence (R2 = 0.069) per pound of housing capital. 
Next we consider the effect of inflation on the user cost. From equation (10) 
we can see that the change in rental cost for a given change in inflation is 
(11)  dR,,,,/d.rr  =  p(1 - O)(di,/d.rr) + (1 - p,)[d(rn  +  .rr)/d.rr] - 1. 
Assuming di,,,/d.rr = 1  ,"6  we calculate that dR,,,,ld.rr  = -0.15.  A 1 percentage 
point rise in inflation reduces the implicit rental rate on housing by 0.15 pence 
per pound of housing capital. This occurs through two channels: a direct chan- 
nel, whereby higher inflation increases the real value of MIRAS, and an indi- 
rect channel, as the fall in the real savings rate reduces the opportunity cost of 
the owner-occupier's equity stake in the house. Hence, the rental rate of 6.9 
pence per pound of housing capital at 2 percent inflation rises to 7.2 pence 
(R,  = 0.072) at zero inflation. 
The implicit rental rate on the non-MIRAS part of the owner-occupied mort- 
gage stock is given by 
+  T,+  m+  6- T. 
The only differences are that we  drop the tax relief terms and assume a 
different mortgage-to-value ratio. Despite the disappearance of the direct tax 
wedge, inflation still affects the user cost because of its impact on the oppor- 
tunity cost of  housing equity. We  would expect the mortgage-to-value ratio 
to be lower for non-MIRAS mortgages and set it to be 35 percent. Using this 
estimate  in  equation  (S),  we  calculate  the  rental  price  to  be  7.5  pence 
(RNON.MIRAS2  = 0.075) at 2 percent inflation and 7.6 pence (R,,N.,,,,,  = 0.076) 
at zero inflation. Not surprisingly, both are higher than the MIRAS user costs. 
A significant proportion of 
the value of the private rented sector housing stock is likely to be owned out- 
right and rented out. But there are also some landlords who let their properties 
Finally, we consider the private rented 
46. It is unclear whether we would expect the pretax Fisher effect to hold exactly. 
47. We  exclude any effects from the public or housing association sectors and concentrate on 
the private rented sector. Together, public sector housing (19 percent) and housing associations (4 
percent) account for 23 percent of the housing stock by tenure. Given an owner-occupied rate of 
67 percent, the residual of  10 percent reflects the proportion of households in the private rented 
sector. We assume that the value of the housing stock is divided in the same proportion as tenure 
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but who have mortgages outstanding. Further, there is tax relief available on 
these loans at the rate of  income tax; and there is no ceiling on this relief. 
Hence, inflation and the tax system again introduce wedges into the rental user 
cost. The user cost for the rental sector, equation (1  3), is similar to the MIRAS 
user cost, equation (10): 
(13) 
=  11.mwa(1 - OREwAL)irn + (1 - ~R,w,t,L)(r,  +  7~) 
+(l-  (P)T~+  m+  6+  T- T. 
There is likely to be a different mortgage-to-value ratio (pRENTAL)  for the 
rental sector than for MIRAS owner-occupiers.  We can deduce this by residual. 
This gives us a 25 percent mortgage-to-value ratio for the rental sector, which, 
as we would expect, is low. The second difference from the MIRAS calculation 
is that the rate of tax relief (Om,,,)  is levied at the individuals’ rate of income 
tax. We calculate this to be 32 percent. This reflects the average effective rate 
of relief claimed by  taxpayers in the three income tax bands (20, 25, and 40 
Not surprisingly, this is higher than the basic rate because of  the 
preponderance of  landlords in  the higher rate  tax  bracket. So despite the 
smallness of the rental sector in stock terms and its low mortgage-to-value 
ratio, the sector is still important because of the size of the tax wedge. From 
equation (1  3), the implied user cost is 7.1 pence with inflation at zero and 6.7 
pence with inflation at 2 percent. Not  surprisingly, these figures differ little 
from those obtained for MIRAS mortgages. 
We next identify the outstanding stock of loans for each sector and the corre- 
sponding value of their housing stocks. Inland Revenue figures show that the 
value of MIRAS tax deductions in 1995 was E2.9 billion. Given a 16 percent 
average rate of  tax relief, this implies total mortgage interest payments of 
around f18 billion. Using the average building society mortgage rate of  7.5 
percent in 1995 implies that the value of the mortgage stock on which these 
MIRAS deductions were made was around f239 billion. If the mortgage-to- 
value ratio is around 60 percent, as we assumed earlier, this makes the value 
of the housing stock on which MIRAS deductions are claimed worth around 
f398 billion. For the rental sector, the current market value of their housing 
stock was around El13 billion in 1995. With a 25 percent mortgage-to-value 
ratio, this implies an outstanding stock of mortgages of around E28 billion held 
by  the rental sector. We  also know that the total stock of  lending secured on 
dwellings in  1995 was  some f390 billion. So we  can determine the  non- 
MIRAS mortgage stock by  residual. This was around El24 billion (E390 - 
f239 -  &28  billion) in 1995. The value of the non-MIRAS housing stock also 
drops out by residual at &356  billion (f753 -  E398 billion).49 
48. Inland Revenue figures suggest that 8 percent of individuals’ rental income is taxed at 20 
49. Hence, the aggregate mortgage-to-value ratio is 35 percent (123/345*100), as above. 
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We  can now evaluate equation (9). See figure 4.5. With no taxes, the rental 
price is R,  and the housing stock is H,.  With existing tax rules and zero infla- 
tion the rental price drops to R, and the housing stock increases to H,.  Finally, 
with inflation at 2 percent the rental cost drops further to R,  and the housing 
stock increases to H,.  The additional deadweight loss of 2 percent inflation is 
the area C + D. By substituting values for the user cost into equation (9) and 
adding subscripts to distinguish MIRAS, non-MIRAS, and rental variables, 
we have 
(14)  GMIRAS  =  0'0154sHRRiMIRAS2  HMlRAS2  3 
Adding these terms together gives us our estimate of  the aggregate welfare 
gain G,. 
To evaluate equations (14), (15), and (16) we now only need an estimate of 
the compensated elasticity of  housing demand with respect to the user cost. 
Feldstein (1997b) assumes E~~  = 0.8. We  take an estimate of the uncompen- 
sated elasticity of 0.53 from King (1980), a unit income elasticity, and a budget 
share of housing of  13.5 percent.50  This gives an estimated compensated elas- 
ticity of around 0.4. 
But the assumption that this elasticity holds for all three categories of hous- 
ing seems implausible. In practice, changes in the user cost are more likely to 
affect the fraction of housing investment that lies above the E30,OOO MIRAS 
ceiling. To account for this, we assume that the elasticity of MIRAS housing 
investment is closer to zero-say,  around 0.1-while  the elasticity of  non- 
MIRAS investment is correspondingly higher at around 1.0.51  This leaves the 
average aggregate elasticity unchanged at 0.4. Substituting these values into 
equations (14), (15), and (16) and summing gives an estimated total welfare 
gain of  around 0.038 percent of  GDP. This is around a quarter the size of 
Feldstein's U.S. estimate. This difference reflects the somewhat smaller mort- 
gage interest relief distortions under the current U.K. tax system. 
4.4.2  Indirect Revenue Effects 
The fall in the housing capital stock associated with a move to price stability 
totals around &12 billion. There are four main channels through which this 
change in housing demand affects government revenues. First, there is a flow 
effect as the reduction in inflation lowers the value of the tax relief subsidy to 
MIRAS holders and to those claiming relief outside of MIRAS (the rental sec- 
tor). This translates into increased revenues of E0.96 billion. Second, there are 
50. Which is the average share of  housing costs in the RPI in the  1990s. 
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direct stock effects on tax revenue. The reduction in the stock of  mortgages 
reduces mortgage payments, thus reducing the value of tax relief and increas- 
ing net tax revenues. This is worth E0.03 billion. It is small because we have 
assumed a low elasticity for the MIRAS mortgage stock. Third, there will also 
be a loss of revenue from property taxes, estimated at E0.09 billion. Finally, the 
transfer of capital to the business sector affects tax revenue. The extra business 
investment yields a return-which  is subject to tax-and  this is worth around 
E0.36 billion.52  The overall change in revenue is 
(17)  dREV,  =  E0.96 +  f0.03 +  E0.36 - E0.09  =  E1.25 billion. 
The overall gain from lower inflation on housing investment is the sum of 
these effects: 
(18)  G,  =  G,  +  AdREV,. 
With these adjustments and X = 0.4, the overall gain is around 0.11 percent 
of  GDP. This estimate is less than half Feldstein’s U.S. estimate (table 4.2). 
That is not too surprising given the gradual erosion in the real value of MIRAS 
over the past 20 years in the United Kingdom. For example, the cost of mort- 
gage relief was reduced from a peak of over 26 billion per annum at the end of 
the 1980s to under E3 billion in 1995. 
4.4.3  Sensitivity Analysis 
Figure 4.6 offers some sensitivity analysis on the results, plotting net welfare 
gains against cHR  and A. Here the risks to net benefits are more clearly on the 
upside, searching across the two parameters. The plane is everywhere positive 
and is increasing in both parameters. The gains themselves are never that large 
over reasonable parameter ranges: they are very unlikely to exceed 0.3 to 0.4 
percent of GDP. But they are nonetheless tangible. Indeed, given the risks that 
attach to achieving such gains via monetary policy, it might plausibly be ar- 
gued that a strong case can be made for fiscal reform. Unlike monetary policy, 
the abolition of MIRAS could be targeted explicitly at extracting the welfare 
gains in figure 4.6; it would have few downside (potentially negative welfare) 
risks, unlike monetary policy, and it could be achieved without incumng tran- 
sient output costs, again, unlike monetary policy. 
Counterbalancing these upside risks, however, is the fact that our compara- 
52. However, this calculation only includes the revenue gained from the existence of the wedge 
between the rate of return earned by companies and the posttax real rate of  interest earned by 
households. Following Dolado, Gonzilez-Phamo, and Viiials (chap. 3 in this volume), there is 
also a value-added tax (VAT) effect. With a capital share of  value added assumed fixed at 37 
percent in 1995 and a pretax return of 8.2 percent, value added will be around 22 percent of  the 
capital stock per year. Given our estimated f10.4 billion rise in the business capital stock, this 
generates an additional €2.3 billion of  value added, which in turn generates f0.4 billion (0.06 
percent of  GDP) of VAT  receipts with VAT  at 17.5 percent. To maintain consistency with other 
countries’ calculations this  additional revenue effect  has not been  added to the results  in the 
main table. 165  Some Costs and Benefits of  Price Stability in the United Kingdom 















Fig. 4.6  Net welfare benefits from housing investment (percent of GDP) 
tive static analysis implicitly assumes that the MIRAShon-MIRAS split of 
mortgages would remain constant if 2 percent inflation were to persist indefi- 
nitely. That is clearly implausible if  the MIRAS ceiling were to remain un- 
changed in nominal terms, as historically it largely has. Inflation then increases 
over time the stock of  mortgages ineligible for MIRAS; it denudes the real 
value of  MIRAS relief. This dynamic effect is not taken into account in the 
above calculus and would act to reduce net welfare benefits over time.53 
4.5  Inflation and the Demand for Money 
4.5.1  “Shoe Leather” Costs 
Following Bailey (1956), the most widely studied deadweight losses of  a 
fully anticipated inflation derive from distortions to money demand, so-called 
shoe leather costs. In essence, these costs capture the transactions time agents 
expend in replenishing money balances, the stock of which is held at a subopti- 
mally low level at any positive nominal interest rate.54 
53. We can gauge its size-and  put a lower bound on welfare gains-by  assuming all of the 
mortgage stock is effectively ineligible for MIRAS. The welfare gain would then fall to 0.04 
percent of GDP. 
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The gain in consumer surplus that results from a fall in inflation from n2  to 
 IT^ is given by the trapezoid underneath a conventional money demand sched- 
ule. This is associated with a fall in the opportunity cost of  money balances 
(proxied here by the nominal net return on a debt-equity portfolio) equal to (rn 
+ ITJ -  (r, + IT,). Friedman's welfare optimum, where the marginal cost and 
marginal benefit of money balances are equalized at zero, is given by the point 
r, +  IT^  = 0. On the assumption of linearity of the money demand curve, the 
trapezoid of lost consumer surplus (G,) can be approximated by 
(19) 
From earlier we have rn = 4.9 percent at 2 percent inflation and rn = 5.1 per- 
cent at zero inflation, given drn/dT = -0.12.  Observing that, again under the 
linearity assumption,  M2 -  MI = -cM[(r,  + v2) -  (rn  + ITJ][M/(~~  +  IT)],  then 
G,  = 0.00109 eM[M/(r,  + IT)],  where a bar denotes a mean value and eM  is the 
interest elasticity of money demand. We  take (F)  = 6.9. For M  we take 
the stock of non-interest-bearing M1 in the United Kingdom. This was equiva- 
lent to 4.9 percent of GDP in 1995.,, 
As in the United States, there are a range of estimates for cM in the United 
Kingdom. But the Bank of England's work (Breedon and Fisher 1993) suggests 
a steady state interest elasticity of around 0.3. This is very much a conservative 
estimate. Others have arrived at higher elasticities looking at longer and more 
recent runs of data.56  But on these conservative assumptions, G, = 0.023 per- 
cent of GDP. This is similar to Feldstein's estimate of 0.016 percent of GDP. 
Moving to the Friedman optimum-of  deflation equal to the real rate of inter- 
est-yields  a welfare gain of G,  = 0.051 percent of GDP. The gains are larger 
here than in Feldstein (0.02 percent of GDP) but remain small quantitatively. 
And although small, these estimates are of  the same order of  magnitude as 
those found in previous partial equilibrium studies, when measured over the 
same interest rate interval. For example, Fischer (1981) and McCallum (1989) 
both arrive at a figure of around 0.3 percent of GDP when transitioning from 
10 percent to zero inflation. Linearly interpolating, this would deliver a gain 
of around 0.06 percent of GDP when moving from 2 percent to zero inflation, 
which is in the same ballpark as the estimates here.J7 
G, = 0.5[(rn + r2)  - (In + nsr,)I(4 -  MI)  + (ro  + vl)(M2 -  MI). 
55. Most authors use an M1 measure of the money stock. This will lead to an overstatement of 
money demand distortions because much of the M1 stock is interest bearing. Feldstein (1995) 
takes the stock of currency and reserves, which will be an understatement because it omits non- 
interest-bearing bank deposits. 
56. Chadha, Haldane, and Janssen (1998) look at narrow money demand relationships between 
1870 and 1994 and find an interest elasticity of around 0.8. Janssen (1996) looks at the behavior 
of MO  during the  1990s and finds that its interest elasticity has risen markedly compared with 
the 1980s. 
57. Neither of these studies takes account of tax effects that mean that the interest rate opportu- 
nity cost falls less than proportionately with inflation. They also use a broader (Ml) measure of 
the money stock. This largely accounts for the differences. See also Feldstein (1979) and, more 
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4.5.2  Indirect Revenue Effects 
Feldstein (1  997b) considers three government revenue implications of  the 
higher real money balances held by agents at lower rates of  inflation: (a) the 
reduction in direct seigniorage revenues as the (inflation) tax rate falls (the 
Phelps 1972 effect), (b) the revenue loss as assets are switched from (taxed) 
capital assets to (nontaxed) money balances (a kind of Mundell-Tobin effect), 
and (c) the reduction in debt service costs as money balances substitute for 
interest-bearing debt. 
On  (a), Feldstein shows that  the marginal response of  seigniorage to  a 
change in inflation is 
(20)  dSE1Gldr  =  Mz{l - &,[d(rn  +  ~r~)/d~r,]~r,/(r,  +  7~~)). 
The term .s,[d(r,, + ~r,)/d~r,]  captures the direct price effect of the fall in the 
tax rate (inflation); and the term Tr2/(r,,  + T,),  the offsetting effect on revenues 
of the rise in the tax base as money balances increase. Using the assumptions 
from earlier gives a net revenue loss equal to 0.09 percent of GDP. 
On (b), the fall in business capital is equal to the rise in money balances 
(M2 -  M,).  The gross real rate of return to capital in the United Kingdom be- 
tween 1970 and 1995 averaged 8.2 percent with a net return of 4.9 percent, giv- 
ing a tax wedge of 3.3 percent points. The revenue loss is 0.012 percent of GDP. 
Finally on (c), we calculate the reduction in government debt service costs 
as rng*(M2  -  MI),  where rng  is the real return on government debt, net of the tax 
the government receives on those interest payments. Proxying gross nominal 
interest payments by  the ratio of  debt interest payments to national debt in 
1995 (6.8 percent), a 1995 inflation rate of 1.6  percent (netting off the measure- 
ment bias), and assuming a marginal tax rate of 3  1.1 percent gives rng  = (1 - 
0.31)*(0.068) -  0.016 = 0.031. The reduction in debt servicing is 0.012 per- 
cent of GDP. 
Bringing these estimates together, we have a shoe leather gain of 0.023 per- 
cent of GDP and revenue losses totaling 0.11  h percent of GDP. So at h = 0.4 
we have a net welfare loss of around 0.022 percent of GDP. These net welfare 
losses are smaller than in Feldstein but are still negative. In all of  our cases, 
the Phelps effect dominates the Bailey effect. 
4.5.3  Risks to the Calculus 
Figure 4.7 conducts some sensitivity analysis, plotting net shoe leather gains 
against E,  and h. From this it is clear that it is quite difficult to make a case 
for a positive net welfare contribution from money demand distortions. The 
net welfare gains are also everywhere small. This reflects the smallness of the 
aggregate currency stock compared with the housing stock. 
But there may also be some upside risks-in  particular to the assumed inter- 
est elasticity-that  are not captured by figure 4.7. We have assumed throughout 
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Fig. 4.7  Net welfare benefits from money demand (percent of GDP) 
on theoretical and empirical grounds, that money demand functions are best 
viewed as a log-linear representation. Such an assumption can have a dramatic 
impact on welfare cost calculus. As we approach nominal interest rates of zero, 
money demand asymptotes on the zero axis, raising the size of  the welfare 
triangle. Lucas (1994) suggests that deadweight losses could then amount to 
as much as 1 percent of GDP when moving to zero nominal interest rates; and 
Chadha et al. (1998) arrive at similar numbers for the United Kingdom also 
using a logarithmic specification. 
Against this, the Lucas  specification does imply that the largest welfare 
gains accrue-the  interest elasticity is largest-near  the Friedman optimum. 
That is not our experiment here. Moreover, neither the United Kingdom nor 
the United States has very much time-series evidence on money demand at 
near-zero interest rates to shed light on the plausibility of Lucas’s thesis. In- 
deed, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1996) argue, contrarily, that money demand 
is likely to be largely interest inelastic at low nominal interest rates. This fol- 
lows from the fact that at low interest rates, the incentive to shift into interest- 
bearing assets is reduced for a large fraction of  the population. They present 
some cross-sectional evidence to support their thesis. And Chadha et al. (1998) 
ultimately reject a log specification over a conventional semilog form as a 
description of  steady state (if not dynamic) money demand behavior in the 
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Another uncertainty concerns the use of a partial rather than general equilib- 
rium framework. The latter approach often appears to have yielded larger wel- 
fare benefits (Cooley and Hansen 1989; Dotsey and Ireland 1996). The source 
of these higher costs is the explicit recognition of laborfleisure choices. So, for 
example, if-as  in Cooley and Hansen (1989)-lower  inflation lowers the tax 
on consumption goods and leads agents to supply extra labor, income will rise. 
The money demand schedule will then shift outward. And welfare gains will 
be correspondingly greater than when income is held fixed, as under the partial 
equilibrium approach. Likewise, the conventional Mundell-Tobin effect of 
moving to price stability-a  fall in capital accumulation as agents switch into 
money balances-need  not arise in a general equilibrium setting. Because in- 
vestment is simply deferred consumption and since inflation acts as a consump- 
tion tax, lower inflation may actually increase investment and the capital stock. 
That would, in turn, reduce some of the revenue losses described above.58 
But even after allowing for these effects, Cooley and Hansen (1989) and 
Dotsey and Ireland (1996) still arrive at welfare costs that are similar to those 
here over the same inflation rate range. For example, a fall in inflation from 4 
to 2 percent in Dotsey and Ireland (1996) still yields a welfare benefit of only 
around 0.045 percent of GDP.59  Moreover, and perhaps most important, neither 
of the above papers recognizes distortionary taxes. Cooley and Hansen (1991) 
do explicitly introduce labor and capital taxes into their earlier equilibrium 
framework. They conclude that while adding in taxes doubles the gross welfare 
costs of inflation, these gains are more than counterbalanced by  the need to 
raise distortionary taxes elsewhere to  satisfy the government’s budget con- 
straint. So the upshot is a net welfare loss-as  here and in Feldstein (1997b)- 
and for the same reasons. So the risks to the above analysis seem to be broadly 
counterbalancing; and they do not clearly imply that the net  distortions to 
money demand are anything other than negligible and quite possibly negative. 
4.6  Debt Service and the Government Budget Constraint 
Lower inflation lowers tax receipts on the nominal interest payments made 
by the government when servicing its debt. Using the government’s cash-flow 
identity and a steady state condition of  a stable debt-GDP ratio, Feldstein 
(1997b) shows that the increase in taxes necessary to maintain a stable debt- 
GDP ratio in the light of this higher debt servicing cost is60 
58. Other effects might be introduced into a general equilibrium setup that would aggravate 
inflation’s distortions. E.g., Dotsey and Ireland (1996) have a model where higher inflation leads 
to an employment redistribution from production toward financial intermediation, where the re- 
turns to the latter are smaller. 
59. Using a currency specification-as  in Feldstein-and  switching off the endogenous growth 
channel. The benefits are, however, much greater as we approach the Friedman optimum. 
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where T denotes taxes (as a percentage of  GDP), Oi is the effective tax rate 
on interest payments, and H denotes government debt (again as a percentage 
of GDP). 
The calculus is complicated slightly in the United Kingdom because, first, 
some large-scale holders of U.K. government debt are tax exempt-in  particu- 
lar pension funds and charities-and,  second, some domestic debt is also held 
by overseas residents, on most of which the U.K. government levies no tax.61 
At the end of  1995, pension funds held 21 percent of the stock of government 
debt and the overseas sector around 14.5 percent. Deducting these tax-exempt 
holdings from the stock of debt gives H = 0.355 (as a percentage of GDP in 
1995, using Maastricht definitions). We  take Oi = 0.31, the marginal personal 
tax rate on debt interest income used earlier, and dr  = 0.02.  So  the welfare 
costs  associated  with  higher  net  debt-servicing costs-and  hence  higher 
taxes-when  moving to price stability are 0.221X. Hence, at A = 0.4 the wel- 
fare cost is 0.088 percent of GDP, and at A = 1.5 it is 0.33  percent of GDP. 
Both of  these welfare losses are slightly lower than  in Feldstein (1997b), 
though not by much. 
4.7  Conclusions 
Adding together the net welfare gains arising from consumption, housing 
investment, money demand, and debt-servicing distortions gives an  aggregate 
welfare benefit of 0.21 percent of GDP, using central estimates of the key pa- 
rameters (see table 4.1).  This annual net welfare gain is translated into a pres- 
ent value using formula (1). Given an estimated discount rate of  5.3  percent 
and growth rate of 2 percent, the net present value of an annual welfare gain 
of 0.21 percent of GDP is equivalent to around 6.5 percent of GDP. 
There are of course uncertainties on both sides of this central estimate, not 
least about the magnitude of the key parameters, and in particular the parame- 
ters measuring the welfare loss resulting from an extra pound of taxation and 
the saving elasticity. Figure 4.8  considers the sensitivity of the aggregate net 
welfare benefit to both of these parameters. 
Any  combination of  the two parameters is associated with a point on the 
contour map indicating the size of  the net welfare gain. High values of  the 
deadweight loss parameters, such as 1.5, eliminate the aggregate benefits en- 
tirely. But a higher saving elasticity increases the estimated welfare benefits. 
The welfare benefits of lowering inflation must be set against any potential 
disinflationary costs. In section 4.2 it was shown that the breakeven benefit is 
61. A third complication comes in the tax treatment of index-linked debt. Coupons are taxed in 
nominal terms and so changes in inflation do have revenue implications, but this is not true gener- 
ally of the capital gains component. We ignore this effect here. 171  Some Costs and Benefits of Price Stability in the United Kingdom 
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Fig. 4.8  Aggregate welfare benefits (percent of GDP) 
0.18 percent of GDP. So on our central estimates of the key parameters, the 
benefits of reducing inflation exceed the costs. 
A major uncertainty concerns the marginal tax rates used in the study. For 
example, when discussing saving, the crucial question is whether marginal 
funds are invested in proportion to their existing share of households’ saving 
(average and marginal tax rates are equal), or whether instead they flow exclu- 
sively into either taxable or tax-exempt vehicles. 
Notwithstanding this caveat, we would make the following observations on 
the basis of our welfare comparisons: First, it is clear that aggregate welfare 
gains in the United Kingdom are much smaller than those of Feldstein for the 
United States-perhaps  around one-quarter the size. Idiosyncrasies in the two 
countries’ tax systems largely account for these differences. Tax wedges tend 
to be smaller in the United Kingdom than the United States. And the sensitivity 
of  tax rates to inflation is likewise less in the United Kingdom than in the 
United States-for  example, because of indexation of capital gains. The grad- 
ual  erosion of  MIRAS and the indexation of  capital gains, to take two ex- 
amples, mean that some of the welfare benefits identified by Feldstein for the 
United States have already been realized in the United Kingdom. 
This leads on to the second point: can we  say whether the welfare benefits 
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identified distortions are the result of the interaction between taxes and infla- 
tion, rather than the result of one or the other acting in isolation. So it is unclear 
a priori whether monetary or fiscal policy is best suited to reaping these bene- 
fits. A full discussion of that issue would take us beyond this paper and into 
the realms of optimal fiscal policy. But the Institute for Fiscal Studies in the 
United Kingdom has already put forward proposals that would all but eliminate 
inflation-induced distortions to corporate taxes,  at little administrative cost 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies 1995). Likewise, the complete abolition of mort- 
gage interest relief would not be a difficult administrative step, though there 
are clearly political economy implications. Upping the limit, or extending the 
range, of tax-exempt savings vehicles would be a third option. 
Third, our analysis takes as given the fact that we are currently operating 
at a second best. It is conceivable-if  not perhaps likely-that  the existing 
configuration of taxes and subsidies is already close to optimal. Adjustments 
to taxes around this point-in  either direction-would  not then be Pareto im- 
proving. This is equivalent to saying that the direct welfare benefits we identify 
may in fact be triangles rather than trapezoids, and that A would, in general 
equilibrium, be high enough to  counterbalance these direct welfare gains. 
More generally, the only foolproof way of simulating the welfare effects of a 
specific changein taxes (and their interaction with inflation) is in a fully gen- 
eral equilibrium model in which A is endogenous to the tax experiment. That 
is the task of another-and  very different-paper. 
Finally, the welfare costs we identify are only a subset of the total costs of 
inflation, and there are a variety of possible extensions to the existing analysis. 
A complete treatment of business investment is one. An initial attempt has been 
made in the appendix. A formal treatment of  front-end loading, as it relates 
to household and corporate debt, is another. And capital flow effects may be 
considered, as in Desai and Hines (chap. 6 in this volume). A fourth is an 
analysis of inflation’s effect on the financing and investment mix of firms. A 
fifth is an analysis of distortions to that part of household savings that is not 
financing U.K.  companies-for  example,  holdings  of  government bonds. 
Hence, the calculations in the paper clearly understate the benefits of reducing 
inflation. A subset of the benefits of reducing inflation is being compared with 
all of  the costs of  achieving price stability. Other benefits of  price stability, 
such as those associated with the-possibly  much larger-welfare  costs of 
unanticipated inflation, are not quantified. Because these costs are positive, 
they would increase the permissible breakeven range of discount rates and out- 
put costs. All in all, the costs of  inflation quantified here go some distance 
toward justifying and explaining the aversion to inflation that is shared by the 
public, economists, and policymakers alike. 173  Some Costs and Benefits of  Price Stability in the United Kingdom 
Appendix 
InJation and Business Investment 
Distortions to Business Investment 
In  the main text we  considered the effects of  a reduction in inflation on 
household consumption and saving, on residential investment, on money de- 
mand, and on government financing. One area that remains is business invest- 
ment. But because households do not consume-at  least directly-the  capital 
stock, it is more difficult to conduct welfare an-alysis on business investment. 
Capital services are not strictly speaking demanded by individual households. 
So the estimates below have a less direct mapping into welfare than those from 
previous sections. That said, it is plausible to think that the physical capital 
stock could enter into agents’ utility functions indirectly, for much the same 
reasons as might the money stock or the human capital stock. Physical capital, 
like human capital and money, is time saving and is thereby leisure and utility 
enhancing. That is one way to interpret the thought experiment below. 
There are a variety of channels through which inflation, operating in tandem 
with the tax system, might affect investment and the capital stock. The most 
widely studied effect of  inflation on investment is through the cost of capital 
(in a U.K. context see, inter alia, King 1974, 1977; King and Fullerton 1984; 
Devereux 1989). With no taxes, the return on a hypothetical investment project 
and the return on the savings used to finance this project will be equalized. 
There is no “tax wedge” between the returns to saving and investment. But 
once distortionary taxes are admitted, the returns to saving and investment will 
differ. There is a tax wedge. The effect of the wedge, for a given saving rate, 
is to increase the effective pretax rate of return that a project must earn to make 
it worthwhile to undertake: it raises the effective cost of capital. This tax wedge 
depends on both the corporate and personal tax systems and their interaction 
with inflation, as well as on the nature of the investment project and its method 
of finance. Higher (personal and corporate) taxes increase the tax wedge and 
hence the cost of  capital. So too does higher inflation as it raises effective 
personal and corporate tax rates. Both taxes and inflation will hence lower the 
capital stock below its no-tax equilibrium. 
The distorting effects of taxes and inflation, acting through business invest- 
ment, can be analyzed using the residential investment framework described 
earlier. Let r, be the cost of capital in the absence of taxes (a zero-tax wedge), 
with corresponding capital stock KO.  With taxes and zero inflation, the cost of 
capital rises to rl (a wedge of  r, -  r,) and the capital stock falls to K,. With 
taxes and 2 percent inflation the corresponding cost of finance and capital stock 
are subscripted with a “2”: the cost of  capital is suboptimally high and the 
capital stock suboptimally low. The resulting distortion from inflation is the 
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where E, is the elasticity of the capital stock with respect to the cost of capital. 
Calculating the cost of capital at different tax and inflation rates requires a 
detailed breakdown of  the components of  the existing capital stock and its 
sources of financing, as well as knowledge of the tax system itself (see, e.g., 
Cohen, Hassett, and Hubbard, chap. 5 in this volume). But our earlier calcula- 
tions, based on the saving-investment nexus, contain most of the basic ingredi- 
ents. For example, the Hall and Jorgenson (1967) tax-adjusted formula for the 
real cost of capital is 
where p is the cost of (debt and equity) financing, 6 is the depreciation rate, q 
is the relative price of capital goods, 7,  is the rate of corporation tax, and z is 
the present value of depreciation allowances. We  devise a proxy for this cost 
of capital at 2 percent inflation (r2)  by adding 6[( 1 -  T,z)/( 1 -  7,)]  to the pretax 
real rate of return to capital among U.K. companies between 1970 and 1995. 
This proxy can be reconciled with equation (A2) as follows. 
As is conventional (King and Fullerton 1984), we assume that providers of 
capital-savers-demand  a fixed posttax return. We  set this posttax return 
equal to its historic value at 2 percent inflation, 4.9 percent.62  But the cost of 
this capital to firms is affected by taxation at both the personal and corporate 
levels. This is embodied in the tax wedge calculated earlier, which explicitly 
takes account of the historical debt-equity split of investment financing and the 
personal and corporate tax rates attaching to returns as they are passed down 
from firms to households. This tax wedge is equal to 3.3 percent. Adding this 
to the posttax return demanded by  providers of  capital gives us the cost of 
funds for firms (p); it tells us the pretax returns available for distribution to 
holders of  debt and equity. Our measure of pretax returns already embodies 
the direct effect of depreciation allowances (z)  on the cost of funds; these are 
captured directly in the corporation tax wedge. We  assume throughout that 
dqlq = 0 and is invariant under inflation. 
But the pretax real return to capital is insufficient by itself to capture fully 
the cost of capital for firms. This is because both the numerator (profits plus 
interest payments) and the denominator (the capital stock) are defined net of 
depreciation. So this measure of the pretax return makes no adjustment for the 
cost of  depreciation. We  take the average depreciation rate, 6 = 5.5 percent, 
from Bond, Denny, and Devereux (1993).  We  then need to make a further ad- 
justment for the interaction between depreciation and z.63 This gives r, = 14.3 
62. The assumption here is that the supply of international capital is perfectly elastic at this rate, 
which is not unreasonable in an open economy setting. To prevent double counting of the capital 
stock effects from section 4.3, we are also effectively assuming q,  = 0, i.e., that private saving is 
interest inelastic at the domestic level. 
63. Investment in vehicles and plant and machinery made up around 75 percent of gross domes- 
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percent. This constructed measure captures quite accurately the cost of capital 
in equation (A2). We  arrive at a rate of return that takes full account of tax 
distortions at the corporate and personal level, of depreciation and depreciation 
allowances, and of the debt-equity financing split of  firm^.^ 
We  can now  simulate the effects of  moving to zero inflation. This has the 
effect of narrowing the tax wedge between the returns to saving and investment 
because of the nonneutralities associated with both personal taxation (of bond 
interest) and corporate taxation (bond interest deductibility and the nominal 
value  of  depreciation  allowances).  Our  earlier  estimates  provided  ready- 
reckoners for these nonneutralities. To these we add a further adjustment to 
reflect the depreciation allowance nonneutrality embodied in the extra depreci- 
ation term. Their combined effect is to narrow the tax wedge-and  hence 
lower the effective user cost of capital-by  0.18 percent points for every per- 
centage point fall in inflation. This gives rl = 13.9 percent. Note also that with 
no taxes, the cost of capital equals the return on saving plus depreciation, r,, = 
10.4 percent-the  minimum posttax return that savers are willing to accept to 
finance a project. Thus we have values for the three costs of capital necessary 
to evaluate equation (Al). 
For the elasticity of the capital stock with respect to the cost of capital, we 
take E,  = 0.5. This is in line with the estimates set out in Mayes and Young 
(1993) for the United Kingdom and is consistent with the international evi- 
dence in Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1996). The net stock of capital held 
by  firms at the end of  1995 (K,) was around &664  billion. Plugging in these 
estimates, the fall in the cost of capital from r, to rl as we move to price stabil- 
ity raises the capital stock by around C17.5 billion. Evaluating equation (Al), 
this then gives a direct “welfare” gain of G, = 0.05 percent of GDP. 
Indirect Revenue Effects 
Again, there are revenue effects associated with this rise in the capital stock. 
In particular, extra tax receipts accrue on the additional investment income 
generated by the higher equilibrium capital stock. These have further positive 
effects on welfare as distortionary taxes elsewhere are lowered, though these 
effects are relatively small, equal to 0.03 percent of GDP with A = 0.4. This 
gives a total net “welfare” gain from the removal of  distortions to business 
investment of around 0.08 percent of GDP with E,  = 0.5 and A = 0.4. 
these weights to capital allowance rates of  25 percent for vehicles and plant and machinery and 4 
percent for buildings gives a weighted average capital allowance rate of 19.7 percent. Assuming a 
declining balance method of depreciation and discounting at the rate of return demanded by inves- 
tors plus the inflation rate provides a measure of z. 
64. One restriction that the analysis imposes is that the market value of a company’s capital and 
its capital stock are equal, that Tobin’s q is unity. 176  Hasan Bakhshi, Andrew G. Haldane, and Neal Hatch 
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Fig. 4A.1  Net welfare benefits from business investment (percent of GDP) 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Figure 4A.  1 plots net benefits arising from reduced distortions to business 
investment against cK  and X.  As with residential investment, the net gains are 
almost everywhere positive, though they are generally smaller than with resi- 
dential investment. But as well as the cost of capital there are other channels 
through which inflation might affect investment. Information asymmetries may 
mean that corporate cash flow has a direct impact on investment, over and 
above cost-of-capital  effects (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988). Since cor- 
porate cash flow is affected by inflation through higher effective tax rates, in- 
flation may have further direct effects on investment spending. Blundell et al. 
(1992) report evidence of just this in a study of U.K. manufacturing compa- 
nies, as do Cummins et al. (1996) in an international context. Because of this, 
the above calculations probably underestimate the benefits of  price stability 
arising from business investment distortions. 
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Comment on Chapters 2, 3, and 4  Andrew B.Abel 
The case studies of Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom-chapters  2, 3, 
and 4-calculate  the costs and benefits of moving from a low rate of inflation 
to a zero rate of inflation using the framework developed by Feldstein (1997). 
This framework emphasizes fiscal channels, both direct and indirect. The di- 
rect fiscal channels arise because the tax codes in these countries are not neu- 
tral with respect to inflation. In particular the taxation of  capital income is 
sensitive to the rate of inflation. The indirect fiscal channels arise through the 
government’s budget constraint, which requires that any changes in seigniorage 
associated with a reduction in inflation be offset by changes in other taxes or 
government expenditures. 
All  three case  studies adhere to  the  framework developed in  Feldstein 
(1997), though the details of tax codes and differences in institutions require 
some modification of the framework for each country. The adherence to a com- 
mon framework simplifies comparisons among these three countries and with 
Andrew B. Abel is the Robert Moms Professor of Banking in the Finance Department at the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and a research associate of the National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 181  Comment on Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
the United States, which was studied by Feldstein (1997). In addition, it simpli- 
fies my task as a discussant of three papers because I have already published a 
comment on Feldstein (1997). In that comment (Abel 1997) I developed and 
calibrated a suitably modified version of the Sidrauski (1967) model to provide 
an alternative set of calculations of the welfare effects of eliminating inflation 
in the United States. Here I will apply this modified Sidrauski model to Ger- 
many, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The presentation of the model is taken 
largely from Abel(l997). I will present the basic model so that all of the nota- 
tion and definitions are contained in this comment, and I will present the first- 
order conditions to give a flavor of  the analytic results. However, I will not 
include the details of the solution procedure but instead refer interested readers 
to Abel(l997). 
An Extension of the Sidrauski Model 
The fiscal channels analyzed in the case studies can be incorporated into the 
Sidrauski model with three modifications. First, the model will include two 
types of capital, which are to be interpreted as housing capital and nonhousing 
capital. Second, the model will include a government budget constraint that 
integrates monetary and fiscal policy. This budget constraint will capture the 
effects of various distortionary taxes and will take account of changes in distor- 
tionary tax rates needed to offset any change in seigniorage when inflation is 
eliminated. Third, labor supply will be endogenized so that taxes on labor in- 
come are distortionary. In the standard version of  the Sidrauski model with 
exogenous labor supply, taxes on labor income do not distort labor supply and 
thus are lump sum. The presence of lump-sum taxes would provide a nondis- 
tortionary way of offsetting changes in seigniorage revenue, which would vio- 
late the spirit of Feldstein’s (1997) analysis and the analyses in the case studies. 
Consider a closed economy with N, identical consumers in period t. The 
population grows at rate n so that  1 + n = N,/Nr-l.  There are two types of 
capital: nonhousing capital (type 1) and housing capital (type 2).  Let Ki,,  be the 
aggregate capital stock of type i(i  = 1,2) at the beginning of period t,  L, be 
the aggregate labor input in period t,  pr  be the price of goods in terms of money, 
M,  be the aggregate nominal money supply at the beginning of period t,  and B, 
be the aggregate nominal stock of government bonds at the beginning of period 
t.  The real per capita values of these variables are k,,, =  KJN,,  1, =  LJN,, m, = 
M,/(p,NJ,  and b, =  B,/(p,N,). 
The Consumer’s Problem 
Asset accumulation of an individual consumer is described by 182  Comment on Chapters 2,3, and 4 
The right-hand side of equation (C 1) represents the consumer's real dispos- 
able resources in period t, which consist of (a) after-tax wage income, where 
w,  is the real wage rate and T, is the tax rate on wages; (b) the value of capital 
held at the beginning of period t plus any earnings on the capital, where Ri,r 
represents the real after-tax gross return (i.e., principal plus income, after tax) 
on capital of  type i; (c) the value of  government bonds held at the beginning 
of period t plus after-tax interest earnings on the bonds, where i:  is the after- 
tax interest rate on bonds; and (d) the real value of  money balances held at 
the beginning of  period t. The left-hand side of equation (Cl) represents the 
consumer's  spending in  period  t, which  consists of  (a)  consumption cl; 
(b) capital to carry into period t + 1; (c) real money balances to carry into 
period t + 1, where T,+,  =  p,+Jp,  is the gross rate of inflation; and (d) bonds 
to carry into period t + 1. 
The utility function of the consumer is 
where p, 6,  q,  +, and + are positive constants.  The consumer chooses consump- 
tion, each type of  capital, real money balances, bonds, and labor supply to 
maximize utility in equation (C2) subject to the budget constraint in equation 
(Cl). Letting P'A,  be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint in  equation 
(Cl), the first-order conditions are 
I will focus on the steady state in which all of the time-subscripted variables 
in equations (C3a) through (C3e) are constant. Solving these equations yields 
the following steady state relations 
1+  n  Rj =  ~  ,  i  =  1,2, 
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In the steady state, the real after-tax gross return on all nonmonetary assets 
is (1 + n)/P.  According to equation (C4a), the real after-tax return on both 
types of capital is (1 + n)/B.' The real after-tax return on bonds is (1 + ib)/n, 
which, according to equation (C4b), is also equal to (1 + n)/P.  Money offers 
a lower pecuniary rate of return than bonds (if ib  >  0),  but consumers willingly 
hold money because money offers a nonpecuniary return (brnP. The optimal 
holding of money is reflected in equation (C4c). Finally, equation (C4d) shows 
that the consumer supplies labor to the point that the disutility of working an 
additional unit is just offset by the additional utility made possible by earning 
additional after-tax wage income. 
The debt service channel analyzed by Feldstein (1997) and the case studies 
is absent in the Sidrauski model. As noted above, equation (C4b) implies that 
the steady state real after-tax rate of return on bonds is invariant to the rate of 
inflation. Thus the real cost of  financing debt, net of taxes levied on interest 
income, is invariant under changes in the rate of inflation. Therefore, no debt 
service channel is reported for the results of the Sidrauski model (summarized 
in table 4C.4, below). 
The Production Function 
The production function is a Cobb-Douglas function of labor and each type 
of capital. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the production 
function can be written (omitting time subscripts) in intensive form as 
(C5)  y  =  Akp'k,"2!1-.1-.2, 
where y = Y/N  is output per capita and the factor shares a,,  a2,  and 1 -  a,  - 
a2  are all positive. In a competitive economy, factors are paid the value of their 
marginal product. Thus the wage rate equals the marginal product of labor 
(C6)  w  = (1 - a,  - a2)y/!. 
The marginal product of type i capital is aiy/k,. Thus, assuming that capital 
does not depreciate, the after-tax gross rate of return on type i capital is 
Ri  = (1 - Ti)ai-  Y  -k  1, 
ki 
where T, is the tax rate on the (net) return to capital of type i. 
1. The rate of return on each type of capital is determined endogenously by eq. (C7) below. In 
the absence of any taxes, the condition that the gross rate of return on capital equals (1 + n)/p  is 
simply the "modified golden rule." 184  Comment on Chapters 2,3, and 4 
Government Budget Constraint 
straint. In the steady state the government budget constraint is 
Monetary and fiscal policy are integrated by  the government budget con- 
The four terms on the left-hand side of equation (C8) are the sources of govern- 
ment revenue: (a) wage tax revenue, (b) tax on income accruing to k,, (c) tax 
on income accruing to k2,  and (d) seigniorage revenue. The right-hand side of 
equation (C8) contains two types of  government spending: (a) real purchases 
of goods and services in the amount of  g per capita and (b) interest payments 
on government debt, net of taxes on interest and rollover of debt. Now divide 
both sides of equation (C8) by y, and use equation (C4b) to obtain 
b 
Y  Y 
=  + (P-1 - 1)(1 +  11)7F-. 
The government chooses the values of  inflation IT, the tax rates on capital T, 
and T~,  the ratio of government purchases to output g/y, and the ratio of govern- 
ment bonds to output bly. The tax rate on wages T, is determined endogenously 
by equation (C9). 
Steady State Equilibrium 
(C6), (C7), (C9), and the goods-market-clearing condition 
(C10) 
It is straightforward to derive closed-form expressions for the steady state val- 
ues of k,, k2, c,  m, and 1.  These expressions are presented in equations (1  la) 
through (1  le) in Abel(l997). 
The steady state is characterized by equations (C4a) through (C4d), (C5), 
c +  n(k, +  k,)  = (1 - g/y)y. 
Calibration of the Model 
The values of parameters used in the initial calibrations of  the model for 
Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom are presented in table 4C.1. Many 
of  the parameter values are the same as in the baseline calibration for the 
United States in Abel (1997). The sensitivity analysis in table 3C.4 in Abel 
(1997) indicates that the general results are fairly robust to variations in param- 
eter values. 
Of  the six preference parameters, four are set exogenously. In the absence 185  Comment on Chapters 2,  3,  and 4 
Table 4C.1  Initial Calibration of the Model 
United 
Germany  Spain  Kingdom  Source 
Preference parameters 
P  0.95 
P  4 
rl  10 
s  4 
9  3.08E-5 
4J  7.448-  11 
Production parameters 
A  235.855 
a1  0.233 
a2  0.067 
n  0.01 
dY  0.22 
blY  0.60 
71  1.02 
71  0.6074 
72  -0,4020 
7,  0.1926 
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GDP minus depreciation 
Noninterest money 
of  compelling evidence to the contrary, and to facilitate comparisons across 
countries, the values of these four exogenously chosen preference parameters 
do not vary across countries. The time preference discount factor p is 0.95, 
which implies a rate of time preference of about 5 percent per year. Calibration 
studies typically choose values of  p greater than one but generally not much 
larger than 5, though there are examples of  much larger values of  p in the 
asset-pricing literature. Here I choose p = 4. The value of q  is even less well 
established. Here I set q = 10. The interest elasticity of money demand equals 
-  1/6. Estimates of this elasticity are small, so I choose 6 = 4, which implies 
an interest elasticity of money demand equal to -0.25.  The value of +  is cho- 
sen so that the value of the money supply m produced by the model equals the 
value shown at the bottom of table 4C. 1. The value of 9 is chosen so that the 
model produces a value of  1 = 1 in its initial calibration. 
The values of  the parameters a,  and a2  in the production function are the 
same as those used in the calibration for the United States in Abel(l997). The 
total factor productivity parameter A is chosen so that y matches the value of 
actual output. The assumption that capital does not depreciate can be inter- 
preted to mean that all depreciation is a reduction in output, and thus the pro- 
duction function can be viewed as a function that yields gross domestic prod- 186  Comment on Chapters 2,3, and 4 
Table 4C.2  Tax Rates on Capital 
Germany  Spain  United Kingdom 
Nonhousing 
7,  (P = 1.02) 
7,  (P = 1.0) 
4 
Housing 
Category  1 (share) 
T2  (P = 1.02) 
T2  (P = 1.0) 
A2 
Category 2 (share) 
T2  (P = 1.02) 
T2  (P = 1.0) 
A2 
Category 3 (share) 
T2  (P = 1.02) 
T2  (P = 1.0) 
A2 
,r2 (a  = 1.02) 
4 
T2  (P = 1.02) 
4 
Category 4 (share) 
T2 (P = 1.0) 
Weighted average 


















































Note:  Categories of housing capital for Spain are owner occupied with tax advantages (I), owner 
occupied with6ut tax advantages (2), non-owner occupied (3), and rental (4). Categories for the 
United Kingdom are owner occupied, MIRAS (l),  owner occupied non-MIRAS (2), and rental (3). 
uct less depreciation. The model is calibrated to match GDP less depreciation 
in each country (shown as y in table 4C.1). 
Of the six variables representing government policy in table 4C.  1, three are 
chosen to match the data directly: the ratio of government purchases to output 
(g/y),  the ratio of government debt to output (bly),  and the gross rate of inflation 
(n).  The tax rates on the two types of  capital are based on the calculations in 
the case studies as shown in table 4C.2. Consider, for example, nonhousing 
capital in Germany. The pretax rate of return, R, - 1, on this capital is 10.8 
percent per year, and the after-tax rate of return is 4.24 percent per year, when 
the rate of  inflation is 2 percent per year. Thus the tax rate on nonhousing 
capital when inflation is 2 percent is T;=I.O*  = 0.6074. The case study of Ger- 
many calculates that at zero inflation the after-tax rate of return on nonhousing 
capital is 4.87 percent so that the tax rate on type 1 capital is T;=I  = 0.5491. 
Thus the change in the tax rate that results directly from a reduction in inflation 
is A, = -0.0583.  Similar calculations yield the tax rates on housing capital in 
table 4C.2. For Spain and the United Kingdom there are multiple categories of 187  Comment on Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
housing capital, and I have computed tax rates for each type of housing capital 
and then computed a weighted average tax rate using the shares reported in 
table 4C.2. Finally, the tax rate on wage income, T,,  is a residual that makes 
the government's steady state budget constraint in equation (C9) hold. 
Effect of Eliminating Inflation 
The effective tax rates on both types of capital depend on the rate of infla- 
tion. Therefore, the elimination of  inflation changes these effective tax rates. 
Let A! be the direct effect on the tax rate T,  of  reducing the rate of  inflation 
from 2 percent per year to zero (i.e., reducing T  from 1.02 to 1.00). In addition, 
there are indirect effects on the tax rates that are needed to satisfy the govern- 
ment's budget constraint. The new set of tax rates, incorporating both the direct 
effect of inflation (including the possibility of a direct effect, A,,  of inflation 
on the labor income tax rate) and the indirect effect of the government's budget 
constraint, are 
(C1  la)  T,  =  (TO,+  Aw)8, 
(Cl  lb)  T, = (T:+  A,)8, 
(C1 lc)  T* = (T;+  AT)€), 
where the superscript 0 denotes the initial values of the tax rates and 8 is the 
amount by  which all three tax rates must be multiplied in order to satisfy the 
government's steady state budget constraint. The direct effects, Ai, are exoge- 
nous, but the indirect effect, captured by 8, is endogenous.2 
To measure the welfare effects of eliminating inflation, I compare the initial 
equilibrium in which the steady state value of the triplet (c,  rn, 1)  equals (co, 
mo, 1) and the new steady state equilibrium in which the triplet equals (Pew, 
mnew,  Pw).  To express the change in welfare in terms of a change in consump- 
tion, define c* to be the level of consumption, combined with the initial values 
of  real money balances and labor, that yields the same level of utility in the 
steady state as the zero-inflation steady state equilibrium. That is, 
(C 12)  u(c*,  mo,  1) = u(c"="W, ,new,  ,",W)* 
I will use (c* -  co)/co  as a measure of the benefit of eliminating inflation. 
Tables 4C.3A, 4C.3B, and 4C.3C present the effects of reducing the inflation 
rate from 2 percent per year (7~  = 1.02) to zero (n = 1) in Germany, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom, respectively. Column (1) in each table ignores the 
direct effect of  inflation on the effective tax rates on the two types of capital 
and takes account only of  the indirect effects on tax rates arising as a result 
of the change in seigniorage revenue when inflation is reduced. This channel 
corresponds most closely to the "money demand" channel. Column (2) focuses 
2. In all policies examined here, the values of  gly and bly are held constant. Table 4C.3A  Effects of Policy Changes: Germany 








































































(c* -  cO)/cO  -0.17  2.09  0.11  2.04 
Table 4C.3B  Effects of Policy Changes: Spain 
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Table 4C.3C  Effects of Policy Changes: United Kingdom 

















































































on the direct effect of inflation on the effective tax rate on nonhousing capital, 
which corresponds most closely to the “consumption timing”-that  is, “non- 
housing capital”-channel.  Column (3) focuses on the direct effect of inflation 
on the effective tax rate on housing capital, which corresponds most closely to 
the “housing” channel. Column (4) considers all three effects together. 
Table 4C.4 summarizes the results of  the various calculations for all three 
countries using the modified Sidrauski model and compares these results with 
those reported in the case studies. It is important to keep in mind that the wel- 
fare costs calculated using the Sidrauski model are expressed as a percentage 
of  steady state consumption, whereas the welfare costs reported in the case 
studies are expressed as a percentage of  GDP. Since consumption is roughly 
two-thirds of  GDP, the overall welfare cost of  2.04 percent of  consumption 
resulting from the application of the Sidrauski model to Germany is remark- 
ably close to the overall welfare cost of  1.41 percent of  GDP reported in the 
case study of  Germany. The results of the Sidrauski model for Germany are 
close to those of  the case study in three additional ways:  First, the benefits 
arising through the money demand channel are very small and slightly nega- 
tive. Second, the benefits arising through the housing channel are also very 
small but are positive. Third, the largest benefits arise as a result of reducing 
the distortions in the effective tax rate on nonhousing capital. 
The Sidrauski model and case study for Spain produce very similar results 190  Comment on Chapters 2,3, and 4 
Table 4C.4  Summary 
Germany  Spain  United Kingdom 
Parameter 




T2  (T = 1.02) 
Effect on consumption 
Nonhousing capital channel 
Housing channel 
Money demand channel 
Overall 
Effect as a percentage of GDP 
Nonhousing capital channel 
Housing channel 
Money demand channel 
Overallb 
0.6074  0.3866 
-0.0583  -0.0353 
-0.4020  -0.3778 
0.01 62  0.0316 
0.104  0.145 
2.09  1.06 
0.11  -0.01 
-0.17  -0.06 
2.04  1 .oo 
Findings of Case Studiesa 
1.48  0.55-0.88 
0.09  1.33 
-0.04  -0.07 














"A = 0.4 for Spain and the United Kingdom. 
bIncludes debt service. 
for the effects operating through the nonhousing capital channel (1.06 percent 
of consumption computed by the Sidrauski model is comparable to the 0.55 to 
0.88 percent of GDP reported by  the case study) and through the money de- 
mand channel (both the Sidrauski model and the case study report a tiny nega- 
tive effect). The major difference between the Sidrauski model and the case 
study concerns the effect operating through the housing channel. According to 
the calculations using the Sidrauski model, this effect is negligible, whereas 
the case study reports this effect to be  1.33 percent of GDP. Not only is the 
value of  1.33 percent reported by the case study much higher than that calcu- 
lated using the Sidrauski model, it is also an order of  magnitude higher than 
the effects reported for the housing channel in the case studies of Germany and 
the United Kingdom. One might expect the housing channel effect to be larger 
in Spain than in Germany and the United Kingdom because elimination of 
inflation changes the tax rate on housing capital by more in Spain than in either 
of the other two countries. However, A*, the change in the tax rate on housing 
capital, is only about a third larger in Spain than in the United Kingdom, so it 
is surprising that the effect operating through the housing channel is 12 times 
as large in Spain as in the United Kingdom. 
For the United Kingdom the results of  the Sidrauski model and the case 
study are somewhat closer than for Spain, though not as close as for Germany. 
Both the Sidrauski model and the case study report very small effects for the 
housing channel and for the money demand channel. Although the Sidrauski 
model and the case study disagree about the signs of these effects, the effects 191  Comment on Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
are all so small as to be essentially zero anyway. As in the case of Germany, 
the largest effect for the United Kingdom operates through the nonhousing 
capital channel according to both the Sidrauski model and the case study. How- 
ever, the effect reported for the Sidrauski model is about two or three times the 
size of  the effect reported in the case study. The nonhousing channel in the 
case study of  the United Kingdom is also smaller than in the case studies of 
Germany and Spain. One might expect a smaller effect in the United Kingdom 
because A,, the change in the tax rate on nonhousing capital, is smaller in the 
United Kingdom than in Germany or Spain. However, A, is only 10 percent 
smaller in the United Kingdom than in Spain, so one might not expect the 
calculated effect operating through the nonhousing channel to be only half as 
large in the United Kingdom as in Spain. 
The Sidrauski model used here has served as a helpful diagnostic tool for 
examining the calculations reported in the case studies. When the Sidrauski 
model and a case study produce different results, there is no presumption that 
one set of results is more reliable than the other. However, in the instances in 
which the Sidrauski model and a case study have produced different results for 
a particular country, the case study results for that country also differ from the 
case study results for the other countries. Thus we are left having to explain 
why, for example, the housing channel effect in the case study of Spain is so 
much larger than in the case studies of Germany and the United Kingdom as 
well  as being larger than  in  the  Sidrauski model. Further  investigation is 
needed to resolve these differences. 
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Comment on Chapters 2, 3, and 4  Rudiger Dombusch 
The comparative evaluation of the case for reducing inflation invites two kinds 
of comments. First, here is an outstanding, and successful, effort, which pro- 
vides a new kind of public finance research effort. Second, the case for reduc- 
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Table 4C.5  International Cost-Benefit Comparison of 2 Percent Inflation Cut 
(percent of GDP) 
Spain  Germany  United Kingdom  United States 
Consumption timing  0.6  1.4  0.2  0.6 
Housing  1.3  0.1  0.1  0.2 
Money  -0.1  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0 
Debt  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
Benefit per annum  1.7  1.4  0.2  0.7 
Annual cost  0.6-1.0  0.3  0.2 
Sacrifice ratio  0.6-1.0  4.0  3.0  2.0-3.0 
Sources: Chapters 1 through 4 in this volume. 
Note: All numbers rounded to the next decimal. 
ing inflation is intriguing but far from made: the painstaking detail in the public 
finance research is matched by the coarsest summing of evidence from macro- 
economics. The two do not mix well. 
The cross-country evaluation is refreshing in highlighting differences in tax 
structures, interacting with differences in the environment, and thus fertilizes 
our thinking about the welfare costs of distortions. The benefits of such cross- 
country comparisons, within the discipline of a unified framework, come in a 
number of ways. First, they are missionary work. They spread their practice of 
rigorous public finance analysis of distortions to countries where little or no 
work may have been done in the past. Not in the least, they create the benefit 
of public finance networks, which are an important ingredient for research. 
The cross-country comparisons are also immediately useful in highlighting 
instances where a particular country’s estimates are far out of line with what is 
reported elsewhere. Table 4C.5 summarizes from the various papers the cost- 
benefit analyses of disinflation using the Feldstein setup. The point about the 
great merit of cross-country research is immediately made by the very fact that 
such a table can be created, including sensitivity tests and the resulting ranges 
of estimates. 
Such a comparison will highlight immediately that in Spain, for example, 
the welfare cost of inflation in the housing sector is unusually large relative to 
the other countries. Similarly, in Germany inflation has a relatively large wel- 
fare cost in affecting consumption timing. 
For the question at hand-do  public finance considerations warrant disin- 
flating by  2 percentage points to alleviate the welfare cost arising from the 
interaction of  the tax system and inflation?-the  answer is 3:l. The central 
banks of Germany and Spain come out strongly in support of low inflation- 
no surprise here. The U.S. analysis, in Feldstein’s hands, yields the same result. 
Interestingly, the preferred estimate of the Bank of England passes the test only 
by a hair’s breadth. Across the wider range of estimates reported in chapter 4, 
the net benefit of  moving to price stability may be positive or negative. The 
reason for the difference resides in the relatively small distortion of consump- 193  Comment on Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
tion choices. But 3:  1 is a victory. So let us assume that the public finance case 
for reducing inflation in countries with U.S.-style tax distortions in interaction 
with inflation is made. Does that mean the public policy debate is finished and 
we should just move ahead, make the necessary recession, get it over with, and 
enjoy the better allocation of resources forever after? 
The issue, of  course, is to take more seriously two problems. The first is 
whether there is some benefit from moderate inflation in making markets func- 
tion better. The second is whether disinflation sacrifice ratios are a good public 
finance tool. 
It is common sense that extreme inflation, if only because of its instability, 
is destructive to productive activity. Beyond that, it is deeply destructive of 
social relations more generally, from property to peace. No more need be said 
on that. But when it comes to the distinction between 2 and zero percent infla- 
tion per year-fully  anticipated and stable-does  the professional bias against 
inflation still apply and does it go all the way  to zero? There is very little 
modeling of this issue, but a few ideas have been around. One strand, coming 
from the 1950s, argues that relative price adjustment needs to happen in a dy- 
namic economy and that it is more easily done when there is an ever so slight 
upward trend in the general price level. The idea is that it is easier to raise 
some prices than to cut some wages. The idea has been picked up again by 
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) in their influential case against deflation. 
The analysis remains crude, but a more careful micromodeling of the produc- 
tivity issues in the workplace (i  la Solow) that arise from wage policy is surely 
possible. If it is easier not to give a wage increase in an environment of rising 
prices than to administer a wage cut in an environment of  stable prices, the 
case is made. The evidence of  Shiller (1997) powerfully supports the con- 
tention that people do have illusions, and there is every reason to believe that 
their productivity is linked to their perception of what is happening to them 
and how “just” they think it is. All of this remains mushy, but it is worth ex- 
ploring even if  it is far away from public finance and dangerously close to 
“human resource management.” 
A second strand is the interaction between inflation and search in monopo- 
listic markets. Some modeling suggests that via signal extraction problems, 
inflation has an impact on the intensity of search effort and hence on the elas- 
ticity of demand facing an oligopolist. More search is better-though  it comes 
at a resource cost too-because  oligopoly represents a welfare cost. Hence, 
what is the optimal rate of inflation? Not zero! If these considerations are valid, 
the presumption for price stability that comes from the interaction of distor- 
tionary taxes and inflation is incomplete and there may be reasons pushing in 
the direction that a bit of inflation is a good idea. 
Even more important is the whole discussion of a short recession to harvest 
the lasting benefits of better resource allocation. True, the authors do not be- 
little the fact that there will be an output loss to disinflation, and there is no 
attempt to lick the lowest sacrifice ratios. But there is nevertheless a temptation 194  Comment on Chapters 2,3, and 4 
to claim that credibility might just come into play and make the entire disinfla- 
tion effort far less costly. It is worth pointing out that there is no evidence to 
support this notion. Argentina is a case in point. Interest differentials on peso 
and dollar assets show that there is no expectation of a regime change; yet in 
the face of  18 percent unemployment, disinflation proceeds at a minimal pace. 
We may not understand why wages and prices do not fall more rapidly, but we 
surely have no right to believe that a credible strategy (whatever that means) 
may not be far more costly than historical experience suggests. 
But there is more important criticism. The sacrifice ratio does a very poor 
job of measuring the costs of disinflation. Not only are the numbers extraordi- 
narily crude to serve as a benchmark, with, possibly minor, extra questions of 
revenue lost during a recession that needs to be made up by distortionary taxes 
and of capital accumulation not having taken place while the recession lasted. 
There is also the much more important question of whether loss in output is a 
good measure of the cost. The most obvious reason for doubt is that the inci- 
dence of  a recession is borne very unequally across individuals. The cohort 
that enters the labor market during a recession is very unlikely to have the same 
lifetime performance as other cohorts. There is obviously no compensation 
for this since nobody imagines that we use neutral lump-sum taxes to make 
compensation payments (beyond unemployment insurance) to the losers. For 
something as important as a recession, glossing over the distribution issue is 
bad public economics. 
Consider the case of Germany. Unemployment is high and has been rising 
for a decade. It is proposed to make a recession at the cost of a 11.8 percent 
loss in output to reach the benefits of better resource allocation. It is difficult 
to believe that this is a priority project compared to restructuring, which is at 
least as controversial as recession but presumably carries far larger benefits. 
In the United States, likewise, there is surely little enthusiasm for ending the 
exploration of just where full employment is in favor of a program of recession 
and the inevitable social fallout it brings. And if one puts the two together, and 
all the other countries, the idea of making a world recession to cure the welfare 
cost of tax distortions interacting with inflation seems outright preposterous. 
There are simply more pressing economic agendas with more clearly identi- 
fied benefits. 
The setup in the comparative exercise is to assume that tax distortions cannot 
be changed-just  take it for granted as an accepted fact of public finance- 
and if that is so, let us at least reduce some of the welfare costs of these distor- 
tions by eliminating inflation. I would submit that making a world recession to 
get at these costs meets just the same opposition. There is just no enthusiasm 
for recessions, perhaps even less than for tax reform. Economists should con- 
centrate on first-best policies rather than create a dubious backdoor case and a 
crude one at that. 195  Comment on Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
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Discussion Summary for Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
In response to Dornbusch's discussion, Gerhard Ziebarth noted that the policy 
implications of his paper can be interpreted in two ways: both as an argument 
for disinflation and as an argument against more inflation. Rudi Dornbusch 
replied that he would applaud the paper as support for an explicit inflation 
target but that the argument made in the paper is really an argument for disin- 
flation, not just an argument against more inflation. 
Jose'  Gonza'lez-Pa'ramo conjectured that a reason for the discrepancy be- 
tween Andrew Abel's estimate of the housing distortion in Spain and his own 
estimate may  be that housing capital does not directly enter into the utility 
function in Abel's  model whereas it does in his own model. 
Abel concurred but also noted that Spain looks very different from Germany 
and the United Kingdom when Feldstein's partial equilibrium framework is 
used. Mewyn King added that it is striking that Abel's calculations do match 
the other authors' calculations for Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Neal Hatch remarked that the consumption distortion effect in the different 
country case studies are not fully comparable because the U.K. case study 
assumes that tax-exempt savings vehicles affect the marginal returns to saving 
whereas the other studies assume that tax-exempt savings is mainly inframar- 
ginal. 
Jose' Viiials agreed with Rudi Dornbusch that one should pay more attention 
to the microeconomics of the labor market and to how inflation affects search 
behavior. He also noted that the benefits of going to price stability may  still 
outweigh the costs even if the capital income tax is lowered in the future, as the 
payback time for price stability is short. He noted further that Spain recently 
experienced disinflation, apparently without an increase in unemployment, in- 
dicating that the sacrifice ratio may be lower for Spain than was assumed in 
the paper. Vifials then acknowledged the importance of political economy con- 
siderations. It seems politically very difficult to remove the underlying distor- 
tions in the housing market, so disinflation may be the best way to effectively 
reduce these distortions. The same point may  not apply to the labor market 
because there are now so many unemployed that there may be enough political 
support to change labor market institutions. 
Stephen Cecchetti remarked that the sacrifice ratio estimates do not seem to 
be very reliable but are rather like glorified back-of-the-envelope calculations. 196  Comment on Chapters 2,3, and 4 
In particular, the estimates have three main problems. First, they do not take 
into account that some component of a recession may permanently decrease 
output. Second, one has to be careful about the underlying source of shocks, 
which seems unlikely. Third, standard econometric techniques are ill suited to 
dealing with policy  shifts to new regimes, leading to estimates of  sacrifice 
ratios that are very imprecise. He concluded that there is still a long way to go 
before we obtain useful estimates of the costs of disinflation. 
James Hines noted that the nature of the model is important for the estimated 
housing distortion. In a one-good model the only possible distortion is to the 
total quantity consumed, but in a multigood model there are also possible dis- 
tortions in the allocation of consumption. 
Rudi Dombusch wondered how the housing distortion in Spain as calculated 
by  Dolado et al. can be five times as large as the housing distortions in the 
other country studies. Martin  Feldstein,  while agreeing that the difference 
seems very large, suggested that the tax rules and other subsidies for housing 
in Spain may be different enough to explain the greater distorting effect of 
inflation.  Andrew Abel agreed with Rudi Dornbusch and stated that he does not 
want to argue whether or not his estimates for Spain are more accurate than 
those of Dolado et al. but remarked that the real puzzle is why Spain differs so 
much from the other countries. Jose' Gonza'lez-Pa'ramo  suggested that a nonlin- 
earity may  account for Spain's apparent anomaly. Abel acknowledged that a 
nonlinearity may explain something but said that he remains unconvinced and 
surprised by the difference of an order of magnitude. 
Edmund Phelps inquired how disinflationary costs, as measured by the sacri- 
fice ratio, are compared to the infinite stream of welfare benefits. In particular, 
does the calculation take into account that the marginal utility of consumption 
declines as per capita GDP rises. Why is the discount rate r -  g instead of r? 
Martin Feldstein responded that the discounting by  the real net-of-tax return 
that individuals receive has the effect of  taking into account the decline in 
the marginal utility of consumption (since individuals equate the ratio of the 
marginal utilities to 1 + u). He noted further that g, the growth rate of GDP, is 
subtracted from r, the real net-of-tax return on risky assets, in order to take 
into account the growth of  the welfare gains, which increase in proportion 
to GDP. 
Mervyn King asserted that the virtue of the four case studies is that they all 
use the same framework, which focuses on interactions between inflation and 
taxes. This make the studies comparable and very interesting. The real contri- 
bution of  the papers is the analysis of  the tax-inflation interaction, not their 
analysis of  the costs of  disinflation. Sacrifice ratios are endogenous policy 
choices, and hence, it is not obvious that past experiences are relevant for the 
future. The estimates of the sacrifice ratio could be over- or underestimates. 
Estimation of sacrifice ratios is a fruitful area for future research. Another key 
question raised by the papers is which margin for savings should be examined. 
How should one take forced savings, pension benefits, and other tax-preferred 197  Comment on Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
savings vehicles into account? What are marginal savings and what are infra- 
marginal savings? This is a very hard issue to determine. 
Martin Feldstein emphasized the great potential gains from the interaction 
of macroeconomics and public economics of the type provided by this confer- 
ence. He expressed his delight with Andrew Abel’s contribution and agreed 
with Abel’s assessment of his paper as a useful start at analyzing the issue from 
a general equilibrium macroeconomic perspective. 
Feldstein said that he  was puzzled that Abel’s  calculation for the United 
Kingdom shows that the increase in nonhousing capital causes a steady state 
consumption gain of 0.75 percent of GDP, which is much larger than the gain 
calculated in chapter 4. This difference might be traced to the different ways 
of calculating the welfare costs of the revenue effect. In principle, it is good to 
derive A, the marginal cost of public funds, endogenously, but we really need 
to use marginal tax rates to derive A rather than the average tax rates that An- 
drew Abel chose in order to calibrate the government budget constraint. The 
implicit marginal cost of  public funds may therefore be too low in his com- 
ment, which would mean that revenue effects are undervalued. 
In response to Rudi Dornbusch’s point about the possibility of a future capi- 
tal income tax reduction, Feldstein noted that he is more pessimistic about this 
prospect. He agreed with the earlier remarks about the importance of correctly 
incorporating tax-favored savings but said that he thinks that many of  these 
tax-favored savings are inframarginal. He agreed with the authors of the British 
case study that the effects of inflation on business investment should not be 
part of the main welfare calculation. Finally, he emphasized that the role of 
VAT  can be important: If housing consumption falls and nonhousing consump- 
tion rises, VAT  revenues increase which increases welfare. 
Rudi Dornbusch argued that the fiscal effects of the recession caused by the 
reduction in inflation should be part of  the welfare calculation. Martin Feld- 
stein responded that these fiscal effects can be seen as a perpetual increase in 
the national debt and that a simple calculation shows that the welfare costs of 
this increase are small enough to ignore. 
Philip Cagan noted that the estimates of sacrifice ratios used in the confer- 
ence papers lie significantly below Arthur Okun’s U.S. estimates of  6 to 18. 
An  often-used methodology involved interpolating GDP between peaks and 
measuring the cumulative difference between actual GDP and interpolated 
GDP. The problem with this method was that GDP at the peaks was not sus- 
tainable because it was too high. Could the method used here to calculate sacri- 
fice ratios suffer from the same problem? 
Benjamin Friedman offered a clarification of Okun’s original methodology. 
Arthur Okun estimated an increase in unemployment of  2 to 6 percentage 
points (with a median of 3 percentage points) per percentage point of disinfla- 
tion. He and others then multiplied these figures by  3, from Okun’s  law,  to 
convert them into percentage points of forgone output. However, present esti- 
mates of Okun’s law are lower, so our estimates of sacrifice ratios are lower as 198  Comment on Chapters 2,3, and 4 
well, but in terms of unemployment our estimates are similar to estimates from 
Okun’s time. 
Frederic Mishkin observed that policymakers often think about the uncer- 
tainty that is created by high levels of inflation. It is an open question whether 
inflation uncertainty would indeed go down if inflation levels were lower. In 
the past five years, there has been very little variability with a level of inflation 
around 3 percent. Would inflation variability decrease if we went to price stabil- 
ity, or would variability increase because there would be less political support 
to combat inflationary shocks if the level of inflation is close to zero anyway? 
Stephen Cecchetti asserted that more work is needed to determine the fron- 
tier relating inflation variability to output variability. One could also measure 
whether this frontier depends on the level of inflation. Variability is ultimately 
an issue of how policies respond to shocks. The stability of the past couple of 
years may simply be due to the absence of significant shocks. 